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I. INTRODUCTION

'"They want to show that the plaintiff is a nut or a slut."'
In contemporary sexual harassment litigation, this statement
reflects a prevailing defense tactic. To establish a prima facie case of
sexual harassment, plaintiffs must affirmatively demonstrate that
they were subject to "unwelcome" sexual advances. 2 Defense lawyers
utilize this standard to discover and admit evidence of the victim's
prior sexual behavior to show invitation to or provocation of the alleged misconduct. 3 While such practices may seem repugnant, their
purpose is readily discernible. By disclosing the intimate details of
plaintiffs' sex lives, defense lawyers, with the sanction of sexual harassment law, force claimants to think twice about continuing their
claims. Potential plaintiffs might reconsider the initiation of a law
suit entirely. In addition, such disclosures may be prejudicial to the
prosecuting claimant, causing the factfinder to render the judgment
or verdict accordingly.
Aggressive defense tactics demonstrate a rational
response to increasing pressure. The combination of greater
publicity of sexual harassment issues 4 and more generous legal
1.
Ellen E. Schultz and Junda Woo, The Bedroom Ploy, Wall St. J. Al (Sept. 19, 1994)
(quoting Philip Kay, plaintiffs counsel in a $7.1 million sexual harassment suit, subsequently
reduced, against the Chicago law firm Baker & McKenzie).
2.
The 1980 EEOC Guidelines defining sexual harassment refer to "[u]nwelcome sexual
advances" as a component of sex-based harassment that is a "violation of section 703 of title
VII." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1994); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq (1994). The EEOC regulations were cited approvingly by the Supreme
Court when it first considered sexual harassment as an actionable claim under Title VII.
MeritorSavings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-67 (1986). Moreover, in referring to the
EEOC Guidelines, the Court asserted that, "[tlhe gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is
that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome.'" Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
The centrality of the unwelcomeness standard and its manipulation by the employment
disrimination defense bar are considered in Parts II and III of this Note.
3.
The defense attorneys interviewed for a recent Wall Street Journal article on sexual
harassment suits expressed some regret, yet little disinclination, to lead the jury into the
victim's bedroom. Schultz and Woo, Wall St. J. at Al (cited in note 1). One lawyer stated, "I
may be uncomfortable doing it-it's certainly something I'd prefer not to do-but I don't allow
myself the luxury of regret." Id. On the subject of welcomeness, another lawyer argued, "If the
plaintiff talked about sex on the job, it makes inquiries into her sexual background relevant...
. If she claims the harassment interfered with her sex life, her extramarital affairs become
relevant." Id. Examples of defense bar direct examination questions include inquiries into the
plaintiff's experience with X-rated films, former lovers, and premarital sex. Id.
4.
In the fall of 1991, the nation was transfixed by the stream of accusations and counteraccusations focusing upon sexual harassment that consumed the confirmation proceedings to
elevate Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court. See, for example, Maureen Dowd, The Thomas
Nomination;Taboo Issues of Sex and Race Explode in Glare of Hearing,N.Y. Times 1-1 (Oct. 13,
1991); Ruth Marcus, Hill DescribesDetails ofAlleged Harassment; Thomas CategoricallyDenies
All Her Charges;Court Nominee Calls Ordeal Lynching for Uppity Blacks,' Wash. Post Al (Oct.
12, 1991). For many commentators, the bruising Hill/Thomas hearings typified how the

1995]

HARASSMENT EVIDENCE SHIELD

1157

remedies 5 has led to an upsurge in the reporting and filing of
employment discrimination claims.6 Moreover, the monetary relief

prevalence of gender-based stereotypes is an obstacle to effective sexual harassment litigation.
See Ann C. Juliano, Note, Did She Ask for It?: The "Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual
HarassmentCases, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1558, 1559 n.8 (1992). See generally 65 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1283, 1279-1582 (1992) (devoting over 300 pages to commentary on the Hilljrhomas hearings).
The accusations of Professor Hill were soon followed by reports of other high profile charges of
sexual misconduct involving Senator Bob Packwood of Oregon, certain naval officers who
attended the infamous 1991 "Tailhook" convention, and President Clinton and Paula Jones. See
generally Helen Dewar and Florence Graves, Packwood: Behavior Was Wrong' SenatorRejects
Calls to Resign, Wash. Post Al (Dec. 11, 1992); John Lancaster, Navy Harassment Probe
Stymied; Aviators Refuse to Help Identify Culprits at Tailhook Party, Wash. Post Al (May 1,
1992); Michael Isikoff, Clinton Named Defendant in Sexual Harassment Suit, Wash. Post Al
(May 7, 1994).
5.
Concurrent with, and, as some have argued, largely as a result of, the publicity
surrounding the Hillfrhomas hearings, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991
Act"), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in various sections of 29
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.), with language liberalizing the remedial scheme available to sexual
harassment claimants under Title VII. See Major Charles B. Hernicz, The Civil Rights Act of
1991: From Conciliationto Litigation-HowCongress Delegates Lawmaking to the Courts, 141
Milit. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (discussing how the 1991 Act may be accurately described as the "Anita Hill
Civil Rights Act of 1991" in light of Congressional efforts to make amends for the confirmation
debacle). Under the 1991 Act, for the first time prevailing plaintiffs may garner compensatory
and punitive damages rather than merely the equitable and administrative remedies that were
formerly the exclusive means of recovery under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (Supp. 1992). In
addition, Title VII claimants may now demand to have their complaints heard before a jury. 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. 1992).
Charles Hernicz laments the enactment of the jury trial and compensatory and punitive
damage provisions of the 1991 Act, due to the shift in focus from "remediation" to "litigation" as
the fundamental employment discrimination doctrine. Hernicz, 141 Milit. L. Rev. at 4. As
Hernicz argues:
The 1991 Act contains... a more fundamental, yet not specifically articulated, change
in employment discrimination theory-the transformation from an administrative
system of remediation to a litigation-oriented cause of action for damages. One of "the
most basic and far-reaching" of [Title VII's] provisions was the emphasis on employeremployee conciliation that was manifested by the laws restrictions on litigation and by
enforcement by the EEOC. The 1991 Act shifts the emphasis of Title VII from
conciliation with equitable remedies to litigation with tort-like damage awards.
Congress made this left turn from the freeway of fundamental civil rights theory
without providing a clear indication of direction or even a likely destination. The
burden of navigating therefore falls on the already overburdened courts.
Id. (citation omitted).
Although the 1991 Act caps the potential compensatory and punitive damage awards
available to plaintiffs by indexing them based upon the size of the employer, it is unclear
whether such limitations preempt relief for other bias claims based upon the same facts. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. 1992) (setting forth the limitations on monetary relief ranging from
$50,000 to $300,000). See also Hernicz, 141 Milit. L. Rev. at 64-68 (discussing the potential
overlap between 42 U.S.C. § 1981a and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 remedies when the plaintiff alleges
multiple theories of discrimination).
6.
Sexual harassment charges filed with the EEOC have increased by 112% over the last
three years, from 5,623 in 1989 to 11,908 in 1993. Study Finds Sexual HarrassmentAwards
from EEOC Doubled from 1992-1993, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, D-9 (May 26, 1994). In
addition, requests for right-to-sue notices for sexual harassment cases have increased from
13.3% of all EEOC resolutions in 1990 to 24.4% in 1993. Id. See also Hernicz, 141 Milit. L. Rev.
at 73 (reporting that sexual harassment complaints with the EEOC were up sixty-nine percent

1158

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 48:1155

recovered by sexual harassment complainants nearly doubled from
1992 to 1993, according to a study of cases handled by the EEOC7

Aside from the direct costs of litigation, sexual harassment cases may
cost a large employer a substantial amount in terms of lost
productivity and talent. Many firms must also employ "slush funds"
to quietly settle suits that could otherwise result in messy public
trials.8 In this environment of sharply increased stakes, the efforts of
employers to intimidate plaintiffs and to indict their character merely
reflect economic and legal realities9
Yet, notwithstanding the media attention devoted to issues of
sexual harassment and the greater likelihood of substantial recovery,
research indicates that sexual harassment remains a vastly underreported form of employment discriminationo despite the fact that the
incidence of sexual misconduct in the workplace is quite high."'

in fiscal year 1992 and that two-and-a-half times as many complaints were filed in the first
quarter of 1993 as compared with the first quarter of 1991).
7.
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100 at D-9. The study "found that 1546 employees won
$25.2 million in monetary benefits from their employers last year, including back pay, remedial
relief, damages, promotions and reinstatements. The number of awards increased by 15.4
percent from the previous year while the amount of the awards increased by 98 percent.. .. "
Id. The author of the study attributed the significant increases to the publicity surrounding the
sexual harassment charges raised by Anita Hill, as well as the provisions of the 1991 Act
allowing the victims of sexual harassment to recover compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
8.
Michelle Ingrassia, Sexual Correctness,Newsweek 57, 58 (Oct. 25, 1993) (stating that
the indirect expenses of litigation "cost Fortune 500 companies more than $8 million a year").
Schultz and Woo, Wall St. J. at Al (cited in note 1) (observing that "[wlith juries
9.
awarding big verdicts, ...
defense attorneys say, cases can't easily be settled for nuisance
amounts, and companies are fighting back with every legal weapon at hand").
10.
For purposes of convenience, the evidence cited in this Note regarding the frequency of
sexual hakassment relates only to female victims. Although studies show that men are a
statistically significant group of sexual harassment complainants, the vast majority,
approaching ninety percent, are women. Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100 at D-9 (cited in note 6).
Of those women who filed charges with the EEOC in 1992, sixty-two percent were white, 14.4
percent were African-American and 14.7 percent were other races. Id.
11. See, for example, Barbara A. Gutek, Sex and the Workplace 46 (Jossey-Bass, 1985)
(reporting that 53.1 percent of working women experience some form of sexual harassment in
the workplace). "Research indicates that the problem is quite pervasive. Estimates of the
percentage of women who have encountered sexual harassment in the workplace range from
42% to 90%." David E. Terpstra and Douglas D. Baker, A Hierarchyof Sexual Harassment, 121
J. Psych. 599, 599 (1987).
In 1981, a federal government report found that forty-two percent of women respondents
claimed that they had been subjected to some form of sexual harassment at an estimated twoyear cost from 1979 to 1980 of $189 million. United States Merit Systems Protection Board,
Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace: Is It a Problem? 2-3 (1981). See also Daniel
Goleman, Sexual Harassment: It's About Power, Not Lust, N.Y. Times Cl, C12 (Oct. 22, 1991)
(describing the government report). Goleman notes:
In a 1981 study of 10,648 women working for the Federal Government, 42 percent say
they had been harassed. In a third of the cases the harassment took the form of
unwanted sexual remarks; 28 percent involved leers and suggestive looks, and a quarter
involved being touched. About 15 percent of women complained of being pressured for
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Few women complain of being sexually harassed because the
12
noneconomic costs of reporting an incident are seen as prohibitive.
Women fear that they will be blamed for the conduct, that nothing
would be done in the event of a complaint, and that they would suffer
negative repercussions in the form of retaliation and further harassment.13 For many women who fear the consequences of a complaint,
14
leaving the job may seem like less effort than filing a claim.
Thus, although a more generous remedial scheme and greatly
increased public awareness encourage women to pursue claims of
sexual harassment, examination of the victim's sex life to demonstrate "welcomeness" compounds the fear and loathing associated
with filing a complaint. The victim of sexual harassment is violated
twice in prosecuting her claim. First, she is subject to the harassing
conduct itself. Then, in attempting to show that the alleged misconduct was invited, her adversary will attack her character and morality.
Recognizing that potential claimants must be encouraged to
prosecute their complaints and protected when they do so, both
dates, and 9 percent said they had been pressured for sexual favors. One percent
reported being assaulted or raped at work.
Id. A follow-up report issued five years later found roughly the same frequency of sexual
harassment, but the costs over a two year period had risen to $267 million. United States Merit
Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassment in the Federal Government: An Update 39
(1988).
12. "Despite company policies forbidding harassment, many victims say they believe that
reporting it will simply lead to more trouble. In a study of 2,000 women working at large state
universities... most had not reported sexual harassment because they feared they would not be
believed, that they would suffer retaliation, would be labeled as troublemakers, or would lose
theirjobs." Goleman, N.Y. Times at C12.
13. See Gutek, Sex and the Workplace at 70-73 (cited in note 11) (describing the reactions
to sexual harassment arising from the author's study). Recent accounts show that the
underreporting of sexual harassment is particularly high in the federal law enforcement
agencies. See Sexual HarassmentClaim HandlingFaulty at Law Enforcement Agencies, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at D-11 (March 9, 1994) (discussing Congressional hearings involving
the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation); Ingrassia, Newsweek at 58 (cited in note 8)(describing the experience
of FBI special agent Suzane Doucette who became the target of a criminal investigation after
filing a discrimination complaint with the Justice Department). Fear of lodging a formal
complaint also permeates the halls of Capitol Hill:
A recent study by the Washington Post showed that more than 93% of congressional
staffers would hesitate to file sexual harassment charges against their elected bosses
and 83% would fear being fired for submitting allegations.
A similar study by the Congressional Management Foundation reported that 60%
of the women who work in Senate offices had misgivings about making complaints, and
nearly 70% said that a formal action could jeopardize their chances to work elsewhere
on Capitol Hill.
Tony Snow, Congress Can Get Away With Nearly Anything, Cleveland Plain Dealer 7B (April 18,
1994).
14. Gutek, Sex and the Workplace at 74.
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Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United States initiated
proceedings that culminated in the recent amendment of Rule 412 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.15 Amended Rule 412, effective
December 1, 1994, regulates both civil and criminal cases involving
sexual misconduct. Former Rule 412 ("Former Rule" or "Former Rule
412")-the "rape shield" rule-barred certain evidence of the past
sexual behavior of an alleged victim in federal rape prosecutions.16
Amended Rule 412 ("Amended Rule" or "Amended Rule 412") bars
evidence of sexual behavior or sexual predisposition in any civil or
criminal proceeding, 17 and, as the Advisory Committee Note states,
'ill

... apply in a Title VII action in which the plaintiff has alleged

8
sexual harassment."'
This Note examines the intended impact of Amended Rule 412
upon the conduct of sexual harassment litigation. Part II considers
the development of sexual harassment as a valid cause of action under Title VII, with particular emphasis upon the unwelcomeness standard. Part III first examines the process by which Rule 412 was
amended under the mandates of the Rules Enabling Act, 19 and how
the drafters of the new rule created a ban on the introduction of evidence that does not foreclose the defendant's opportunity to prove
welcomeness. Part III then explores the numerous arguments that
introduction of evidence of unwelcomeness distorts the factfinding
process by infusing often irrelevant and highly prejudicial information
into sexual harassment proceedings. These arguments support the
creation and enforcement of a sexual harassment evidence shield.
Part IV of this Note discusses the standard by which evidence
of the plaintiffs sexual conduct or sexual predisposition remains
admissible under the revised rule. While Amended Rule 412 significantly narrows the range of evidence available to the defendant, it

15. The full text of Amended Rule 412 is included in Appendix I.
16. In particular, the rape shield rule barred sexual history evidence "in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of an offense under chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code."
Chapter 109A of title 18 proscribes knowing involvement in "aggravated sexual abuse" or
knowing or complicit involvement in acts of "abusive sexual contact." 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and
2244 (1988). See text of Former F.R.E. 412 codified at 28 U.S.C. app. F.R.E. 412 (1988). Unless
otherwise indicated, all citations to F.R.E. 412 and the accompanying Advisory Committee
commentary refer to the amended version of the rule.
17. F.R.E. 412(a)(1),(2).
18. Notes of Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 412.
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1988). While both Congress and the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference considered separate amendments to
Rule 412, this Note will focus upon the amendment undertaken pursuant to the Rules Enabling
Act. Although both Houses of Congress, in separate legislation, considered extending Rule 412
to civil cases, the text ultimately adopted is that of the Judicial Conference's amendment. See
notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
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provides that such evidence "is admissible if it is otherwise admissible
under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the
danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party."20
The substantive portion of Part IV, then, concerns the categories and
types of sexual history "otherwise admissible" under the federal evidence rules with probative value high enough to withstand the presumption against admission. As set forth in Part IV, efforts to show
welcomeness involve the circumstantial use of character evidence for
a "non-propensity" purpose. The admission of such evidence is governed by Rule 404(b). By its language, Rule 404(b) allows the introduction of evidence of specific acts only, barring admission of opinion
or reputation evidence. 21 Reference to evidence "otherwise admissible" under the federal rules thus ensures that only specific acts may
be considered for admission under Amended Rule 412.
Finally, Part IV considers the balancing test contained in section (b)(2) of the Amended Rule. While the Advisory Committee Note
accompanying the new rule offers very little guidance regarding the
admissibility of otherwise proscribed evidence, existing cases holding
certain evidence inadmissible under the welcomeness standard provide guidance as to the proper balance between probativeness and
prejudice. Examination of these cases in light of the policies underlying the amendments to Rule 412 will provide guidance for future
application of the rule.
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE "UNWELCOMENESS" STANDARD

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers
from discriminating with respect to compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 22 With little legislative history to guide interpretation
of Title VII's prohibition against discrimination based on sex,23 courts

20. F.R.E. 412(b)(2).
21. F.R.E. 404(b) permits the introduction of evidence of "other crimes wrongs or acts...
to show motive, opportunity, intent .... " See notes 200-18 and accompanying text.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
23. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. The reference to sex discrimination was a last-minute
amendment to Title VII. Id. at 63. See Juliano, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1562 n.26 (cited in note 4).
"The amendment was proposed by Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, Chairman of the
House Rules Committee. Some commentators believe the prohibition against discrimination
based on sex was added as an attempt to defeat the entire bill." Id. "[The inclusion of 'sex'] was
offered as an addition to other proscriptions by opponents in a last-minute attempt to block the
bill which became the Act . . . ."

Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

Representative Smith's plan failed. "One of the most powerful remedies for sex discrimination
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initially struggled with the application of Title VII to claims of sexual
harassment. 24 By the last half of the 1970s, however, courts began to
recognize sexual harassment as a valid claim under Title VII. 25 While
the early cases incorporating sexual harassment as actionable employment discrimination were premised upon the status of the parties
and the demand of sexual consideration,26 later cases began to recognize unwelcome sexual attention as an additional cause of action
under Title VII.27

available today owes its origin to a misfired political tactic on the part of opponents of the Act."
J. Ralph Lindgren and Nadine Taub, The Law of Sex Discrimination110-11 (West, 1988).
24. Juliano, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1563. See also Michael D. Vhay, The Harms ofAsking:
Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 328, 329-33
(1988) (citing and discussing the early cases which refused to find that sexual harassment
violated Title VII). Title VII bars discrimination "because of" the targets sex. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 (a)(1)-(2). This standard, commonly referred to as the "but for" test, requires that the
proscribed action would not have occurred "but for" the employee's gender. The early cases
construing Title VII's applicability in respect of gender discrimination found that sexual
harassment did not meet the but for test. The harassing conduct did not occur because of the
victim's sex, but rather because of the unique interpersonal relationship between the parties.
See, for example, Corne v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975); Barnes
v. Train, 13 FEP Cases (BNA) 123, 124 (D. D.C. 1974). For these courts, "Jane Doe was
harassed because she was Jane Doe, not because she was a woman." Juliano, 77 Cornell L. Rev.
at 1563.
25. In 1976, the federal district court for the District of Columbia found that the
retaliatory actions of a male supervisor taken because a female employee declined his sexual
advances constituted sex discrimination within the parameters of Title VII. Williams v. Saxbe,
413 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (D. D.C. 1976). The defendant in this case argued that the plaintiff's
refusal to provide sexual consideration did not separate her as an impermissible class from
other employees (men) subject to similar demands. Id. at 657. The court rejected this argument
noting that "the plaintiff's supervisor created an artificial barrier to employment which was
placed before one gender and not the other, despite the fact that both genders were similarly
situated." Id. at 657-58. The following year, the Third Circuit also held that Title VII is violated
when a supervisor makes sexual advances toward a subordinate and then conditions the
employee's job status on a favorable response to the advances. Tomkins v. Public Service Elec.
& Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977).
26. See Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Colo. 1978) (finding
that a supervisor's sexual demands on his female subordinate had become a "term or condition"
of employment, and thus actionable under Title VII); Garberv. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552
F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (D. D.C.
1980) (same); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that
when an employer actively or tacitly approves of a personnel policy requiring sexual favors as a
condition of employment, such a case would be actionable under Title VII).
27. See, for example, Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding
that an abusive work environment constitutes a term or condition of employment, and is thus
actionable under Title VII notwithstanding the lack of tangible job detriments); Walter v. KFGO
Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309, 1316 (D. N.D. 1981) (accepting the proposition that an "intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment" would create a cause of action under Title VII); Brown v.
City of Guthrie, 22 FEP Cases (BNA) 1627, 1631-32 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (same). Susan Estrich
argues that the early "egregious" cases of sexual harassment involving demands for sexual
consideration in exchange for job benefits "paintied] a picture of sexual harassment as an
extreme and rare event." Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 813, 822 (1991). Estrich
argues, "[iln real life, sexual harassment is a pervasive and common problem, but the cause of
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In 1980 the EEOC issued guidelines on sexual discrimination
that explicitly recognized sexual harassment as a violation of Title
VII.2

As the administrative interpretation of the statute by the en-

forcing agency,29 the guidelines, although not binding upon the courts,
were accorded deference30 in the development of the sexual harassment cause of action.31 The guidelines' definition of sexual harassment was designed to incorporate cases in which job benefits are
premised upon accession to sexual demands as well as cases in which
the unlawful conduct creates a hostile or abusive work environment.32
Both variants of actionable sexual harassment are currently
recognized by the courts. "Quid pro quo" harassment occurs when the
extension or denial of job benefits flows from the employee's submission to or rejection of her supervisor's advances.3a The paradigm
factual situation is "sleep with me or I'll fire you,"' yet courts have
recognized a range of attempts to trade employment opportunities for
sexual favors as meeting the necessary demand of reciprocity.35 The
action was premised on its being unusual and rare. Perhaps there was no other way to win the
early battles." Id.
28. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1993)). See generally
Nancy Fisher Chudacoff, Significant Development, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex: Employer Liabilityfor Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 535
(1981).
29. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34 (1971).
30. See, for example, Bundy, 641 F.2d at 947; Walter, 518 F. Supp. at 1315; Caldwell v.
Hodgeman, 25 FEP Cases (BNA) 1647,1649 (D. Mass. 1981).
31. As the Supreme Court has instructed, the EEOC's interpretations of Title VII
"constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting
Skidnore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
32. 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980). Specifically, the Guidelines define sexual harassment as
"[ulnwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature ...." 29 C.F.I. § 1604.11(a) (1993). The harassment becomes cognizable
under Title VII under the following conditions:
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct
by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual,
or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.
Id.
Feminist scholars offer less restrictive definitions of sexual harassment as "the unwanted
imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power," Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassmentof Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination1 (Yale U.,
1979); and "unsolicited nonreciprocal male behavior that asserts a woman's sex role over her
function as a worker," Lin Farley, Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassmentof Women on the
Job 14 (McGraw-Hill, 1980).
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1),(2) (1993).
34. Juliano, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1566 (cited in note 4).
35. See, for example, Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1048-49 (finding a violation of Title VII when a
supervisor conditions the entirety of a subordinate's job status, including her "evaluation
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second, and more recently developed, sexual harassment claim involves unwanted or unilateral sexual advances that are not directly
linked to tangible job detriments or benefits. Hostile work environment harassment occurs when the employee is subject to conduct that
is demeaning or degrading because of her gender, regardless of
whether demands for sexual consideration are involved.36
Under the EEOC guidelines, both quid pro quo and hostile
work environment claims are premised upon an assessment that the
alleged misconduct was "unwelcome. ' '37 Only unwelcome advances or
requests may constitute sexual harassment irrespective of the further
criteria enumerated in the guidelines. In other words, the conduct
must be unwelcome before it can create an intimidating work environment or form the basis of an illegal demand for sexual consideration.
In 1982, the Eleventh Circuit created a two-part standard for
unwelcome sexual conduct in Henson v. City of Dundee.38 The court
continued employment, promotion, or other aspects of career development" on a favorable

response to his sexual advances).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3). The physical or verbal abuse suffered by the employee
poisons the work environment, interfering with her capacity to perform her job. See Meritor,
477 U.S. at 67 (holding hostile work environment harassment actionable under Title VII if it is
"sufficiently severe or pervasive to 'alter the conditions of [the victim's employment' ").
37. The EEOC Guidelines state: "Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct ... constitute sexual harassment...." 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a) (1993) (emphasis added).

38. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). The court explicitly relied upon the EEOC Guidelines
in formulating the elements of a valid claim for sexual harassment under Title VII. Id. at 903
(explaining that "the EEOC has recently issued regulations that provide a useful and
informative set of guidelines on sexual harassment"). The court repeatedly cited the EEOC
Guidelines in structuring the elements of proof necessary to establish prima facie claims of quid
pro quo and hostile work environment harassment. Id. at 903-04 (hostile work environment),
909-10 (quid pro quo).
Because "neither the courts nor the E.E.O.C. have suggested that every instance of sexual
harassment gives rise to a Title VII claim against an employer," id. at 903, the Henson court
promulgated discreet elements of proof that the plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate to
make a prima facie showing of the validity of her claim. Id. at 903-05 (five part test for hostile
work environment harassment), 908-09 (five-part test for quid pro quo harassment). While the
five-part tests for quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims issued in Henson vary
slightly, they are identical with respect to the required showing of "unwelcomeness." Id. at 903
(hostile work environment), 909 (quid pro quo). Under the Henson rules, to establish a claim of
hostile work environment harassment, the plaintiff must show: (1) the employee belongs to
protected group; (2) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the
harassment complained of was based upon sex; (4) the harassment complained of affected a
"term, condition, or privilege" of employment; and (5) respondeat superior. The elements of a
quid pro quo claim are identical except for conditions (4) and (5). For a complete examination of
the standard of employer liability for sexual harassment, see Glen Staszewski, Note, Using
Agency Principlesfor Guidance in Finding Employer Liability for Supervisor's Hostile Work
Environment Sexual Harassment, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1057 (1995). To establish either sexual
harassment claim under the Henson tests, then, a complainant must prove that she was
"subject to unwelcome sexual harassment." Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (citing the EEOC
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defined unwelcome sexual conduct as conduct that the employee did
not solicit or incite, and that is undesirable or offensive to the em-

ployee3 9 Other courts have had difficulty applying this standard,
however, because the alleged conduct may be offensive or undesirable
to the plaintiff, yet nonetheless "welcomed" by her in the eyes of her
harasser. In essence, while the complainant may subjectively find the
advances offensive, thereby fulfilling the latter portion of the Henson
test, her supervisor or coworkers may view her outward conduct as
indicative of her receptiveness.40 Such potential inconsistencies in the
application of the rule have not slowed its adoption, however, for an
affirmative showing of unwelcomeness is now required in a majority
of federal circuits.41
Four years after Henson, the Supreme Court took up the issue
of sexual harassment as a Title VII cause of action. In a seminal opinion, Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson,42 the Court established

regulations for the proposition that "only unwelcome sexual advances generate Title VII
liability).
39. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (citing Gan v. Kepro Circuit Systems, 28 FEP Cases (BNA)
639, 641 (E.D. Mo. 1982); Vinson v. Taylor, 23 FEP Cases (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980)).
40. The confusion generated by a test of unwelcomeness that incorporates both subjective
and objective elements is exemplified by the district court's struggles in Burns v. McGregor
ElectronicIndustries,Inc., 807 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa 1992). In an earlier hearing of the same
case, the district court had concluded that, while the defendant's work environment was
abusive, the plaintiff lacked the capacity for offense because she had appeared nude in a
national magazine distributed in the workplace. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
stating that the lower court's finding of unwelcome harassment was inconsistent with its ruling
that the plaintiff was not offended by the conduct of her employer. Burns v. McGregor
ElectronicIndustriesInc., 955 F.2d 559, 565 (8th Cir. 1992). On remand, however, the district
court again found for the employer on the basis that the plaintiffs past conduct rendered her
incapable of offense. Burns, 807 F. Supp. at 509. In essence, the district court subordinated the
plaintiffs subjective findings of hostility and harassment to the objective effect that her outward
conduct-having appeared nude-had on her employer and coworkers. See also EEOC Policy
Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 3114 at 3271
n.10 (March 19, 1990) (advocating that EEOC investigators prioritize the objective effects of the
charging party's conduct in evaluating welcomeness).
41. See Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of Welcomeness in Sexual
HarassmentCases, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 499, 513 n.85 (1994) (citing opinions of the eleven of thirteen
circuit courts of appeals that have required an unwelcomeness showing in a sexual harassment
claim). Seven circuit courts of appeal have expressly adopted Henson's prima facie showing of
unwelcomeness. See Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 782-84 (1st Cir. 1990);
Paroline v. Unisys Corp, 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on reh'g, 900 F.2d 27
(4th Cir. 1990); Jones v. FlagshipInternational,793 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1986); Yates v. Avco
Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 634 (6th Cir. 1987); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir.
1988); E.E.O.C. v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515 (9th Cir. 1989); Sparks v. Pilot Freight
Carriers,Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987). The Second Circuit, although not citing
Henson, has also adopted an unwelcomeness requirement. Carrerov. New York City Hous.
Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir. 1989). But see Drinkwater v. Union CarbideCorp., 904 F.2d
853, 860 (3d Cir. 1990) (declining to impose a welcomeness standard).
42. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). For a thorough analysis of Meritor, including the proceedings
below, see generally Christopher P. Barton, Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place: A
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that both variants of sexual harassment are actionable under Title
VII.43 It is the Court's analysis of the welcomeness standard, however, that has had a potentially broader effect on sexual harassment
litigation in this country. 44
In Meritor, the district court found that the respondent engaged in voluntary sexual activities and could not therefore state a
claim of sexual harassment. 4 - The Supreme Court dismissed the dis-

trict court's reliance on the "voluntariness" of the sexual relations,
holding instead that a factual determination of welcomeness must
control.46 According to the Court, it is the obligation of the trier of fact
to determine "whether [the plaintiff] by her conduct indicated that the
alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual
participation... was voluntary." 47
The Court also reversed the D.C. Circuit's presumption that
evidence of the respondent's "dress and personal fantasies" was irrelevant.48 Under the Court's reasoning, inquiries into the plaintiffs
receptiveness are not limited to instances of actual sexual contact, but
also include reference to the complainant's speech, mannerisms, and
choice of clothing.
Henson and Meritor thus establish that the plaintiffs invitation to or provocation of the alleged harassment is of central, if not

Considerationof Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson and the Law of Sexual Harassment,67
B.U. L. Rev. 445 (1987).
43. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (quid pro quo) and 73 (hostile work environment). Meritor is
one of only two cases in which the Court has squarely considered the status of sexual
harassment under Title VII. In the second opinion, Harrisv. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court
reaffirmed Meritoryet held that the plaintiff need not show that the conduct creating a hostile
work environment "seriously affect[ed] plaintiffs psychological well being." 114 S. Ct. 367, 371
(1993).
44. See The Supreme Court-LeadingCases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 100, 283-84 (1986) (stating
that the showing of welcomeness sanctioned in Meritoris a new "defense" to sexual harassment
that "entirely misunderstands what constitutes 'receptive' sexual behavior by females" and that
will end up putting the plaintiff on trial).
45. Meritor,477 U.S. at 67-68.
46. Id. at 68. The Court stated that "the fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in
the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a defense to
a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII." Id. The Court held instead that "[tlhe
gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were
'unwelcome.'" Id. (citing the EEOC Guidelines, 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985)). Although
voluntariness and welcomeness would appear to be synonymous, the Court was attempting to
distinguish voluntariness-which is read as consent (rape)-from welcomeness, an entirely
different factual matter.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 68-69. The Court stated that "it does not follow that a complainant's sexually
provocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she
found particular sexual advances unwelcome. To the contrary, such evidence is obviously
relevant." Id. at 69.
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claim. 49

Unwelcomeness is a factual issue which, under the EEOC guidelines,
must be determined in light of "the record as a whole" and under "the
totality of the circumstances. '5O Evidence of welcomeness beyond the
immediate circumstances of the alleged misconduct therefore becomes

49. Criticisms of the welcomeness test abound. Principally, critics argue that the
plaintiff's proof of unwelcomeness is an anomaly in Title VII litigation. In other disparate
treatment contexts, specifically racial harassment, the offensive conduct is presumed to be
offensive and the plaintiff is under no burden to establish the existence or materiality of the
harassing conduct. See Lisa Rhode, Note, The Sixth Circuit'sDouble Standard in Hostile Work
Environment Claims: Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988), 58 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 779, 812 (1989) (stating that racial comments are intrinsically offensive). The
presumption that harassment based on race, religion and national origin is inherently
unwelcome led to the much earlier development of hostile work environment theories for these
forms of employment discrimination. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)
(race); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (religion); Cariddi v.
Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (national origin).
It is argued in response that sexually suggestive conduct can, under certain circumstances,
have social utility, and, moreover, that it is much harder to control than speech or conduct
reflecting racial biases. One writer has noted: "[S]exually-oriented speech includes an added
dimension of legitimate traditional courtship activity which makes it more difficult to regulate
than speech focusing on race, religion, or ethnicity." Theodore F. Claypoole, Comment,
Inadequacies in Civil Rights Law: The Need for Sexual Harassment Legislation,48 Ohio St. L.
J. 1151, 1154 (1987). The EEOC concurred in its amicus brief in Meritor. "Whereas racial slurs
are intrinsically offensive and presumptively unwelcome, sexual advances and innuendo are
ambiguous: depending on their context, they may be intended by the initiator, and perceived by
the recipient, as denigrating or complimentary, as threatening or welcome, as malevolent or
innocuous." Brief for the United States and Equal Opportunity Employment Commission as
Amici Curiae at 13, MeritorSay. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979).
The conception that racial harassment is qualitatively different than sexual harassment
reflects a continuing bias in sexual harassment law grounded in sexual stereotypes. The fact
that the workplace is not presumptively free of sexually offensive conduct means that the law
recognizes that "boys will be boys." The workplace is an extension of the dating scene, and,
within this environment, women act at their peril if they speak, dress, or act in a certain way.
As one commentator has stated: "Women have a right to work in any given working
environment without constantly negotiating sexually offensive conditions and without
monitoring their dress and speech to make sure they are exuding an appropriate level of
unwelcomeness." Jolynn Childers, Note, Is There a Place Fora Reasonable Woman in the Law?:
A Discussion ofRecent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment,42 Duke L. J.
854, 862 n.29 (1993).
Sexual harassment law would much better serve the objectives of Title VII, and better
recognize the sexual behavior of men and women, if the "unwelcomeness" test were
substantially modified. The workplace should be presumed to be free of sexually offensive
conduct, thereby removing the plaintiffs burden of establishing offensiveness. In addition,
because a woman's election to be available to a man is not fungible-it does not translate into a
desire for all men-the burden of persuasion to establish the plaintiffs appreciation of the
alleged misconduct should shift to the defendant. For additional arguments modifying the
operation of the "unwelcomeness" test, see id.; Catherine A. O'Neill, Comment, Sexual
HarassmentCases and the Law of Evidence: A ProposedRule, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 219, 235
n.60 (1989); Radford, 72 N.C. L. Rev. at 524-48 (cited in note 41).
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1993); Meritor,477 U.S. at 69 (citing same).
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relevant, 51 although the admissibility of such evidence is left to the
52
prerogative of the trial court.

Procedurally, unwelcomeness is an evidentiary issue 5 3 that, as
the totality of the circumstances test requires, involves a wide range
of facts. 54 The plaintiff has the burden of persuasion, yet the burden
is'discharged when unwelcomeness is established by a preponderance
of the evidence. 55
On appeal, the factual finding of
(un)welcomeness is subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard of
review. 56
After Meritor and the extension of the Court's imprimatur, the
concept of unwelcomeness is firmly entrenched in sexual harassment
law. The range of evidence to be considered by the factf'mder is limited only by the totality of the circumstances, including conduct well
beyond the conditions that prompted the complaint. While the plaintiff faces a comparatively light burden in establishing unwelcomeness,
a contrary finding quickly hardens and may not be disturbed upon
review.

51. Pursuant to the "totality fo the circumstances test," defendants offer, and many courts
accept, evidence of the plaintiffs sexual history wholly unrelated to the transition in question.
See Part III.B.3 for a criticism of this phenomenon.
52. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (stating that evidentiary questions involving relevance and
prejudice are "properly addressed to the District Court").
53. Chudacoff, 61 B. U. L. Rev. at 561 (cited in note 28) (stating that "[w]hether the
advances are unwelcome... becomes an evidentiary question well within the courts' ability to
resolve"); Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
54. See note 51.
55. Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1499 (W.D. Mo. 1989). The
preponderance standard is a benefit for plaintiffs because it reduces the quantum of evidence
that they must present in order to make an affirmative showing. As the Perkins court noted:
"Preponderance of the evidence means [merely] the greater weight of evidence." Id. Because
plaintiffs bear the burden of persuasion, however, if the evidence is equally balanced or of equal
probativeness, the plaintiff has not met her burden. Smith v. United States, 726 F.2d 428, 430
(8th Cir. 1984).
It has been argued that the purposes of Title VII would be better served by a shift in the
burden of persuasion to the defendant. This would mean that sexual harassment would be
presumptively unwelcome and that zero sums in the parties' evidence of unwelcomeness would
be construed in favor of the plaintiff. Childers, 42 Duke L. J. at 862 n.29 (cited in note 49).
56. F.R.C.P. 52(a). "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Id. If there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the interpretation assigned by the trier of fact must be adopted,
particularly when the interpretation hinges upon credibility determinations. Anderson v.
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL SEXUAL MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE
SHIELD
The unwelcomeness test, particularly as interpreted in
Meritor, licenses the defendant to discover and introduce a broad
range of evidence regarding the plaintiffs conduct. If the plaintiffs
speech and dress are relevant to the determination of welcomeness, 57
certainly other sexually-oriented conduct in the workplacea or in
other contexts becomes material.s9 The broad latitude given the defense bar in establishing that the plaintiff welcomed her harassment"°
powered the drive to amend Rule 412.61
A. The Amendment of Rule 412
The Federal Rules of Evidence contain provisions protecting
litigants from the admission of irrelevant or prejudicial evidence. 2 In
rape prosecutions, however, the inquiry into whether the victim consented to sexual contact renders the victim's past sexual behavior
material. Prior to the enactment of Rule 412,63 a rape victim's past
sexual behavior was introduced by the defendant to impeach her
credibility" as well as to demonstrate her desire for sexual relations
57. See note 48 and accompanying text.
58. Participation in lewd or vulgar workplace humor, for example.
59. See, for example, Stang v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2657, *4
(E.D. Ill.) (rejecting defense counsel's attempt to introduce legitimacy of plaintiff's children).
60. Commentators argue that the maintenance of the unwelcomeness standard in sexual
harassment law means that "harassment" should be stricken from the designation of the cause
of action. In essence, if harassment can be welcomed, how does it remain harassment? See
Juliano, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1570 (cited in note 4) (citing dictionary definitions of harassment
to show that it implies unwelcomeness).
61. See Notes of Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 412 ("[t]he [new] rule aims to safeguard the
alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarassment and sexual stereotyping
that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details").
62. See F.R.E. 402 and 403.
63. Rule 412 was the creation of Congress alone rather than the product of Judicial
Conference-Supreme Court deliberations pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
2071-2077. The Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978 (H.R. 4727) became law on
October 28, 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046 (1978). The legislation's sole purpose was
to add Rule 412 to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
64. The impeachment theory holds that an unchaste woman, therefore a woman of bad
moral character, is less likely to speak the truth than a woman of good moral character. See, for
example, State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99, 28 P. 28, 29 (1891); Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467, 4 N.E.
63, 65 (1885). By the time of the enactment of Rule 412, many courts barred the use of a rape
victim's past sexual history for impeachment purposes on the basis that there is no logical
relation between character for chastity and character for truthfulness. Such a position "would
necessarily imply the absurd proposition that the extra-marital sexual history of a female
witness would be admissible to impeach her credibility in any case in which she testified." State
ex rel. Pope v. SuperiorCourt, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946, 950 (1976) (en banc). See also McLean
v. United States, 377 A.2d 74, 79 n.8 (D.C. App. 1977) (stating that, if admissible, such evidence
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on the occasion charged. 65 Recognizing the logical inconsistencies
inherent in the use of such evidence 66 and the damage to the victim
involved in its admission, Congress enacted an affin-mative evidence
shield under Rule 412 to replace the more ambiguous, discretionary,
and considerably less restrictive provisions of Rules 404-406, 608-609,
and 611(a) that previously governed the admissibility of evidence of
67
the victim's past sexual history.
The effort to amend Rule 412 to incorporate civil actions involving sexual misconduct originated in Congress.68 Under the Rules
Enabling Act,69 however, Congress gave the federal judiciary the
power to prescribe its own rules of conduct and procedure.70 By the

could be used to impeach the veracity of a woman anytime she testified); State v. Geer, 13 Wash.
App. 71, 533 P.2d 389, 391 (1975) (finding that a woman's unchaste character has little bearing
on her ability to tell the truth).
65. F.R.E. 404 proscribes the use of character evidence to prove that an individual acted in
conformity with his or her character trait on a particular occasion. F.R.E. 404(a). In criminal
cases, however, a defendant is privileged to introduce "[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of
character of the victim of the crime" as an exception to the propensity rule. F.R.E. 404(a)(2). In
the majority of jurisdictions, the privilege is limited to proof by opinion or reputation evidence
only. This exception has been employed by rape defendants to establish consent. If the victim
has been promiscuous or unchaste in the past, it is more likely that she consented to sexual
contact with the defendant. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Note to F.R.E. 404(a)(2) explicitly
states that "an accused may introduce pertinent evidence of the character of the victim.., in
support of a claim of... consent in a case of rape. . ... " Notes of Advisory Committee, F.R.E.
404(a)(2).
Although rape defendants are invited by the evidence rules to introduce the victim's past
sexual history as evidence of her character for promiscuity, many courts, even prior to the
enactment of Rule 412, employed considerations of relevance and probative value to exclude
such evidence. See, for example, United States v. Stone, 472 F.2d 909, 916 (5th Cir. 1973);
McLean, 377 A.2d at 77; State ex rel. Pope, 545 P.2d at 949; People v. Whitfield, 58 Mich. App.
585,228 N.W.2d 475,478-79 (1975); Geer, 533 P.2d at 391.
66. For a thorough discussion of the false linkages between a woman's sexual history and
her character for veracity and her character for promiscuity, see O'Neill, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F.
at 224-33 (cited in note 49).
67. In the discussion preceding the passage of H.R. 4727, the bill that ultimately became
Rule 412, the bill's sponsors criticized the "traditional approach" of the federal evidence rules
that "permit[s] great latitude in bringing out intimate details about a rape victim's life." 124
Cong. Rec. H34912 (Oct. 10, 1978) (statement of Representative Mann). To protect the privacy
of rape victims, the rape shield rule was designed to "preclude the routine use" of evidence of
past sexual history in favor of a more limited regime of admissibility pursuant to the guidelines
of the new rule. Id. at H34913 There were no House, Senate, or Conference Committee reports
on Rule 412, and, because the rule was solely the creation of Congress, no Advisory Committee
note was drafted. For additional legislative history on predecessor bills, see Privacy of Rape
Victims, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 29, 1976).
68. See, for example, 137 Cong. Rec. S9610 (July 10, 1991) (proposing harassment
evidence shield, Rule 412B, as a provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1991).
69. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077.
70. In particular, the Supreme Court has the power to prescribe the rules of practice and
procedure (including the evidence rules) for the federal judiciary. 28 U.S.C. § 2072. The grant
of rulemaking authority is subject to Congressional review and Congress maintains the ultimate
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spring of 1992, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules of the
Judicial Conference had begun to consider its own alternative to the
Rule 412 amendments then percolating through Congress.71 The
minutes of the committee's meeting of October 1992 and the report of
the committee chairman on the proposed changes to Rule 412 reveal
that the preferred method of amending Rule 412 was pursuant to the
procedures of the Rules Enabling Act. 72 Throughout 1993 and the
majority of 1994, two separate proposals to amend Rule 412 existed-one the creation of Congress and the other the creation of the
Judicial Conference. 73 In the end, however, Congress adopted the text

legislative right to reject, modify, or defer any of the rules created by the federal judiciary. 28
U.S.C. § 2074(a).
71. Minutes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12
(April 23-24, 1992) (all minutes, letters and correspondence referring to Rule 412 are available
from the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the
United States). The Judicial Conference of the United States is responsible for "carry[ing] on a
continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now
or hereafter in use as prescribed by the Supreme Court for the other courts of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988). To aid it in the discharge of this duty, the Judicial Conference
may authorize the appointment of advisory committees that consider and recommend rules of
practice and procedure for the federal judiciary. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(2). At the present time,
there are five advisory committees serving the Judicial Conference, including an Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules. When the amendments to Rule 412 were first considered under
the auspices of the Rules Enabling Act, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules had been
deactivated and the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules was responsible for Rule 412. The
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules was reactivated in December 1992, and it thereafter
shepherded the amendments to Rule 412.
72. The minutes of the Criminal Rules Committee's October 1992 meeting disclose that
assurances were given to Senator Joseph Biden, the primary sponsor of the Senate's efforts to
amend Rule 412, that "Rule 412 would be given early and prompt consideration under the Rules
Enabling Act," and that any proposed amendments "would be published on an abbreviated
comment period." Minutes of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 13 (Oct. 12-13, 1992). See also "Letter of Transmittal to Judge Robert E. Keeton,
Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, from Judge William Terrell
Hodges, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules" in Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, Commitee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States ("Preliminary
Draft") 104 (Dec. 1992) (reporting the committee's proposed rule to the Standing Committee).
"Given Congress' high interest in the topic of violence against women, the committee believed
that it would be appropriate to propose changes to Rule 412 through the Rules Enabling Act
procedures and publish the proposed amendment for public comment." Id.
It is unsurprising that organs of the Judicial Conference would assert their primacy in the
rules amendment process, yet ironic given the fact that Rule 412 was solely the creation of
Congress. See notes 63, 66-67, and accompanying texts.
73. During the period in which the Conference's proposal was subject to scrutiny under
the Rules Enabling Act, members of the Judicial Conference sought to forestall further action on
the Congressional proposal. See, for example, Letter of Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and Stanley Marcus, Chair, Ad-Hoc Committee
on Gender-Based Violence to Senator Joseph Biden (Oct. 18, 1993) ("The [Conference]
amendment[ I reflect[s] the deliberative and exacting process contemplated by the Rules
Enabling Act.... Most respectfully, we renew our suggestion that [Congressl proposed changes
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and supporting advisory committee note of the Judicial Conference
proposal, and the proposed rule became law when it was incorporated
in the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 74 This Note
therefore tracks the development of the revisions to Rule 412 made
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.
As published for public comment, proposed Rule 412
("Proposed Rule" or "Proposed Rule 412") contained a number of reforms, beyond the extension of the rule to civil cases, that substantially departed from the then-existing framework of the rape shield
rule. 75 The Proposed Rule simplified the form and structure of the
rape shield rule to eliminate some of the confusion caused by the rule
in its then present form. 76 Under the Proposed Rule, a three-part
structure establishing: (1) a presumption against the admissibility of
past sexual behavior; (2) exceptions to the inadmissibility
presumption; and (3) court guidelines governing the admissibility of
excepted evidence replaced the more convoluted provisions of the
Former Rule. This format was carried over to the Amended Rule and
is now the foundation of the provision adopted by Congress.
A principal casualty of the Proposed Rule's simplified provisions was the rape shield's explicit ban on the use of opinion or reputation evidence. 77 Both the Proposed and the Amended Rule establish
a presumption against the use of sexual history evidence, yet appear
to admit evidence of opinion, reputation, or specific instances of con-

to Evidence Rule 412... be withdrawn to permit the remaining important stages of the Rules
Enabling process to go forward"); Letter of Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Standing Commitee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, to Senator Joseph Biden (March 30, 1994) ("the amendments to
Evidence Rule 412... are in the final stages of the rulemaking process. Approval of legislation
that would directly amend these rules, despite the nearly concluded rulemaking process, would
effectively bypass the Rules Enabling Act process, render useless the hard work of our volunteer
lawyers, judges and professors and frustrate the intent of the Act").
74. P.L. 103-322, Title IV, Subtitle A, Ch. 4 at 40141(b), 109 Stat. 1919 (1994).
Congressional action on Rule 412 was required because the Supreme Court, as the final judicial
authority on the federal rules, 28 U.S.C. § 2074, had transmitted the Conference's proposal to
Congress stripped of any reference to Rule 412's incorporation of civil actions. Congress
restored the rule's references to civil actions in the 1994 crime bill (H.R. 3355) and the sexual
harassment evidence shield became effective December 1, 1994.
The substitution of the Conference's proposal is unremarkable because, by the time the full
Congress would have considered passage of its own proposal, the amendment process under the
Rules Enabling Act had been completed. Congress, therefore, adopted a new rule created in
accordance with statutory authority and with the participation of interested members of both
the bench and the bar.
75. The text of Proposed Rule 412 appears in Appendix II.
76. Proposed Advisory Committee Note ("Proposed Note") reprinted in Preliminary Draft
at 115 (cited in note 72).
77. "[Rleputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim...
is not admissible." Former F.R.E. 412(a), 28 U.S.C. app. F.R.E. 412 (1988).
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duct if such evidence of past sexual behavior survives the presump78
tion against its use.
The Proposed Rule, while disposing of the explicit ban on opinion and reputation evidence, widened the scope of sexual history
evidence covered by Former Rule 412. In addition to the presumption
against admissibility of evidence of past sexual behavior, the
Proposed Rule also presumptively barred evidence of sexual
"predisposition.' 9 The Advisory Committee note to the Amended
78. Several commentators on the rule proposal argued that the loss of an explicit
reputation and opinion evidence ban would greatly reduce the protection afforded victims of
sexual misconduct, thereby undercutting the policy of the new rule. See, for example,
Statement of Women's Legal Defense Fund on Proposed Amendments to Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, (April 28, 1993). "[R]eputation and opinion evidence are especially problematic,
because of their dubious reliability, limited probative value, and potential for prejudicial
impact." Id. at 10. Congress apparently agreed because its proposed rule retained the opinion
and reputation evidence ban of the rape shield rule.
In her summary report of public comment on the proposed rule, Dean Margaret A. Berger,
reporter for the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence, surmised that removal of the opinion
and reputation evidence ban was necessary because the drafters envisioned that the new rule
would apply to cases involving sexual misconduct in which the plaintiffs character is at issue.
Report of Margaret A. Berger, Reporter, Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence 23 (May 3,
1993) ("Berger Report"). The example offered by the Advisory Committee of such a case was a
defamation action where "[opinion and reputation] evidence might be essential to show that the
alleged defamatory statements were true or did not damage the plaintiffs reputation."
Proposed Note at 120 (cited in note 76).
The evidence rules permit proof by opinion, reputation, or specific instances of conduct when
character is in controversy. F.R.E. 405. The paradigm case is defamation. Edward W. Cleary,
ed., McCormick on Evidence § 187 at 551 (West, 3d ed. 1984). Dean Berger argued, however,
that a reasonable reading of the proposed rule would require that the rule only apply if the
person against whom evidence is offered may be characterized as a "victim of sexual
misconduct." Solutions Memorandum of Margaret A. Berger, Reporter, Advisory Committee on
Rules of Evidence 8-9 (May 3, 1993) ("Berger Memorandum"). Such victims would include the
actual targets of sexual abuse rather than, for example, the targets of defamatory comments
regarding sexual promiscuity. In essence, then, because most victims of sexual misconduct do
not put their characters in controversy, the rules permitting the offer of opinion and reputation
evidence when character is in issue should not overcome or even apply to Rule 412's evidence
shield. The current Advisory Committee Note to Rule 412, at Dean Berger's suggestion, now
reads that cases involving sexual misconduct in which the person against whom evidence is
offered is not properly considered a "victim" (target) of the misconduct are beyond the scope of
Rule 412. Notes of Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 412. The relationship between sexual
harassment claims and the modes of permissible proof under Rule 412 is discussed in Part IV.
79. Proposed F.R.E. 412(a), reprinted in Appendix II. The Proposed Rule failed to provide
a definition of sexual predisposition, however, and this prompted several commentators to
request that one be supplied. See Letter of Professor Paul F. Rothstein to Judge Ralph K.
Winter, Chair, Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 5 n.7 (May 9, 1993) (noting that
predisposition is a new word in the Federal Rules of Evidence); Statement of Professor Myrna
Raeder, Chairperson, Rules of Criminal Procedure and Evidence Committee, Criminal Justice
Section of the American Bar Association 7 (April 12, 1993) ("ABA Statement") (stating that the
commentary must clearly address the definition of predisposition); Comments of the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 6 (April 14, 1993) (arguing that unless sexual
predisposition is clearly defined as a category of proscribed evidence it should be excluded from
the rule). In her summary report, Dean Berger responded to the requests for a definition of
sexual predisposition. Berger Report at 5-6, 20. "[T]he addition of 'predisposition' . . . [is]
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Rule now states that evidence of sexual predisposition is proof "that
does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that the
proponent believes may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder.
Admission of such evidence would contravene Rule 412's objectives of
shielding the alleged victim from potential embarrassment and safeguarding the victim against stereotypical thinking."8 0 The addition of
a presumptive ban on predisposition evidence, therefore, recognizes
that proof of the victim's speech, dress, or lifestyle, although sexually
suggestive, should not be admissible.
Although the Proposed Rule broadened the scope of proscribed
evidence, it also provided exceptions to the proscription under certain
circumstances. 81 As published for comment, the Proposed Rule contained two alternate exceptions for civil cases. The first stated that
sexual behavior or predisposition evidence would be admissible if it
were "essential to a fair and accurate determination of a claim or
defense"; the second alternative provided that such evidence could be
used if "its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of
unfair prejudice to the parties and harm to the victim.' 82
The Advisory Committee ultimately opted for the balancing
test.83 Given the remedial purposes of the rule, particularly the desire
intended to cover evidence that is being offered for the inference that the victim engaged in
prior sexual conduct, but that does not fit into a plain meaning definition of sexual misconduct.
Examples are evidence of dreams, fantasies, partying, watching pornography and provocative
dressing." Id. at 20. Dean Berger proposed that the Advisory Committee commentary make
clear that the additional ban on "predisposition" evidence was incorporated to fully effectuate
the protections of Rule 412. Berger Memorandum at 2.
80. Notes of Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 412.
81. See Proposed F.R.E. 412(b)(4), reprinted in Appendix II.
82. Id.
83. Most of the commentators on the Proposed Rule had favored the latter of the two
proposals. They argued that a balancing test involving considerations of probative value and
prejudice would be familiar to the courts and that the requirement that the probative quality of
the evidence "substantially" outweigh its prejudicial impact would serve to protect alleged
victims. Comments of the Committee on Federal Courts, The State Bar of California 4 (April
30, 1993); ABA Statement at 9 (cited in note 79). Several commentators noted, however, that in
civil cases in which only a preponderance is required for plaintiffs to win, it would be unfair to
deny defendants admittedly relevant evidence. See Comments of Professor Edward L. Kimball
2 (March 3, 1993) (stating that the extant provisions of F.R.E. 403 offer the correct standard);
Comments of the Federal Rules of Evidence Committee of the American College of Trial
Lawyers 5 (April 7, 1993) (arguing that the qualifying adverb "substantially" be removed
because it tips the scales too far in admitting relevant evidence).
The Federal Courts Committee of the New York City Bar Association ("Federal Courts
Committee") articulated a strong preference for the "essential evidence" option, however, noting
that "the first alternative is preferable because it better ensures that a rule of evidence will not,
directly or indirectly, effect a significant change in substantive law." Report on Proposed
Amendments to Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence by the Federal Courts Committee of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 3 (April 29, 1993) ("Federal Courts
Committee Report"). In particular, the Federal Courts Committee was concerned that adoption
of the balancing test, coupled with the new rule's presumption against the use of sexual history
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to protect victims of sexual harassment,8 this choice was the rational

alternative. If the sexual history evidence used to prove welcomeness
is deemed "essential," and if essential evidence is excepted from Rule
412's proscriptions, then the exception eviscerates the rule. The
creation of a sexual harassment evidence shield is pointless if the
proof excepted from the rule is exactly the evidence that the rule is
designed to ban. Moreover, if the determination of whether evidence

evidence, would amend the substantive law of sexual harassment by limiting the defendant's
capacity to prove welcomeness. Id. at 3-9. In favoring the "essential evidence" option, the
Federal Courts Committee asserted that the substantive law of sexual harassment, especially
the defendant's opportunity to defend on the basis of welcomeness, should not be co-opted by a
procedural provision. In addition to advocating the "essential evidence" option under proposed
F.R.E. 412(b)(4), the Federal Courts Committee also endorsed the inclusion of explicit guidelines
in the Advisory Committee commentary on the construction of the term "essential." Id. at 10.
Specifically, the Federal Courts Committee proposed its own addition to the commentary that
read that the requirement that evidence be essential, although creating a higher standard of
relevancy than that prescribed by Rule 402, "is not intended.., to preclude a litigant from
introducing evidence necessary to establish a claim or defense." Id. at 3. The obvious
implication for judges and practitioners seeking guidance on excepted evidence would be that
proof of welcomeness is "essential" to the defense of sexual harassment claims.
Michael Chepiga, the Federal Courts Committee's representative at the Advisory
Committee hearings on Proposed Rule 412 (held May 6, 1993), argued that the new rule should
not affect the development of the substantive law. "That is for the judges construing the
statutes in the cases to develop... [a] rule of evidence shouldn't dictate that or lead the way on
that." Transcript of Proceedings, Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules 15
(May 6, 1993).
Noting the Federal Courts Committee's preference in her summary report, Dean Berger
responded by questioning the effect of the proposed balancing test upon the substantive law of
sexual harassment. Berger Report at 26 (cited in note 78). "Whether the second proposed
alternative in subdivision (b)(4) must be rejected as inconsistent with the developing
substantive law of sexual harassment is debatable." Id. Berger argued that the Meritor Court
itself envisioned a balancing test for the admissibility of the sexual harassment plaintiffs past
sexual conduct. Id. (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69, stating that "the District Court must
carefully weigh the applicable considerations [i.e. probative quality and prejudicial impact] in
deciding whether to admit evidence of [the plaintiffs provocative dress and publicly expressed
sexual fantasies]"). Yet, in advising the Advisory Committee, Dean Berger declined to endorse
outright either the essential evidence or balancing test option. "The Advisory Committee will
have to consider carefully whether the notion that some evidence of an alleged victim's prior
sexual history and predisposition may be excluded in a sexual harassment claim-in accordance
with the applicable substantive law-is better handled through the first or second alternatives."
Id. at 27.
84. While the text of the Proposed Rule stated in subdivision (a) that the new sexual
behavior and predisposition evidence shield would extend to civil cases, several commentators
noted that the rule, either in the text or commentary, should explicitly incorporate sexual
harassment. See, for example, Statement of Women's Legal Defense Fund on Proposed
Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 412 8-9 (April 28, 1993) (arguing that "[t]he term
'sexual misconduct' as used in the proposed amendments should be clearly defined to include
claims of sexual harassment. Without explicit guidance, some might inaccurately interpret the
term 'cases involving sexual misconduct' in an unduly narrow way-for example, as including
only those civil cases involving physical contact, such as sexual assault").
As enacted, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 412 states that "Rule 412 will... apply in
a Title VII action in which the plaintiff has alleged sexual harassment." Notes of Advisory
Committee, F.R.E. 412.
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is "essential" is made on a case-by-case basis, this would call for the
courts to reach conclusions that they have not been trained to draw by
the other provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The prevailing
advantage of the balancing test is that the courts are accustomed to
its provisions. The comparison of probative quality and prejudicial
impact is mandated by Rule 403, and the courts are therefore familiar
with the terms of the balancing test favored by the Advisory
Committee and now required by the exception to the sexual harass5
ment evidence shield.
With respect to sexual harassment, then, the Proposed Rule,
although it removed the ban on opinion and reputation evidence, substantially increased the protections afforded victims of workplace
harassment. The rule barred evidence not only of the plaintiff's sexual behavior, but also proof of her dress, speech, and lifestyle that
might give rise to sexual connotations. The combined effect of the
shield against sexual behavior and sexual predisposition evidence was
to preclude all types of proof of welcomeness-evidence of past sexual
history as well as sexually explicit conduct not involving actual sexual
contact. In addition, the drafters of the Proposed Rule, in opting for
the balancing test for excepted evidence, declined to label proof of
welcomeness "essential" to the defense of a sexual harassment claim.
Rather, the Advisory Committee adopted the position that proof of
welcomeness is conditionally relevant. It is admissible only if its
probative worth substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
The Supreme Court, however, pursuant to its authority, gutted
the proposed rule, stripping it of references to civil cases. 6 The Court,
in its annual transmission of rule proposals to Congress, ordered that
Rule 412 take effect without applying to civil cases.87 The Court's
primary concern was that the extension of the rule to civil cases
would abridge the substantive rights of defendants. 88 In particular,
the Court argued that the amendment could exceed the Court's
authority under the Rules Enabling Act, which bars the creation of

85. The civil case exception that initially appeared at subdivision (b)(4) of the Proposed
Rule now appears at subdivision (b)(2) of the Amended Rule. See F.R.E. 412 (b)(2).
86. See Randall Samborn, High Court Rejects Move for Civil Rape Shield, National Law
Journal A12 (May 23, 1994).
87. Id. The Court's order and the text of the rule as transmitted to Congress appear at 62
U.S.L.W. 4301 (May 10, 1994).
88. Letter of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to the Honorable John F. Gerry, Chair of
the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States (April 29, 1994),
reprinted in Communication from the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court of the United States,
Transmitting an Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence as Adopted by the Court,
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2076, House Document 103-250, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
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rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."8 9 To
illustrate its argument, the Court pointed to the threat posed by the
Proposed Rule to evidence of welcomeness solicited by Meritor.90
Implicit in this illustration is the fact that the Court viewed proof of
welcomeness to be integral to the maintenance of the defendant's
substantive right of defense against claims of sexual harassment.91
Part III.B of this Note is a response to the Court's opposition to
the creation and enforcement of a sexual harassment evidence shield
under Rule 412. While the new rule substantially reduces the quantum of proof of welcomeness formerly available to defendants, it does
not completely foreclose the defendant's capacity to demonstrate
provocation or invitation of the alleged misconduct if the evidence is of
sufficient probative quality. Because introduction of proof of welcomeness distorts the fact-finding process by infusing often irrelevant
and highly prejudicial information into sexual harassment proceedings, an affirmative limitation on the use of such evidence is necessary.
B. A Civil Sexual HarassmentEvidence Shield Is Justified
The law of evidence presumes that most evidence, if relevant,
is admissible. 92 Even relevant evidence must be excluded, however, if
the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs probative value. 93 'Probative
value" refers to the capacity of the evidence to prove an issue of consequence in the litigation94 "Unfair prejudice" concerns the likelihood
89. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).
90. Id.
91. In its comment endorsing the "essential evidence" option for excepted evidence, the
Federal Courts Committee thus foreshadowed the position ultimately taken by the Supreme
Court. See note 83.
Congressional adoption and enactment of the Proposed Rule rendered moot the Court's
opposition, however, for Congress retains the capacity to modify substantive legal rights
through the legislation of rules for the federal courts. As stated by the Supreme Court in
Hanna v. Plumer. "[The constitutional provisions for a federal court system... carries with it
congressional power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in
turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area
between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either." 380 U.S.
460, 472 (1965). Congress is therefore immune to considerations of whether an ostensibly
procedural provision detracts from underlying substantive legal rights. Its rulemaking
authority is not subject to Rules Enabling limitations.
92. F.R.E. 402 establishes the presumption that virtually all relevant evidence is
admissible unless something can be found to bar it. "Relevant" evidence is evidence that has the
"tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." F.R.E. 401.
93. F.R.E. 403.
94. Charles A. Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure:
Evidence § 5214 (West, 1978).
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that the proffered evidence will divert the trier of fact, leading to
decision on an improper basis.95
The probative value of the plaintiffs sexually-related conduct
is nearly always suspect, and, moreover, such evidence tends to divert
the factf'mder from an examination of the plaintiffs allegations to an
evaluation of her conduct. The substantial prejudice and lack of probative value associated with admission of plaintiffs past sexual conduct provide ample basis for the development and enactment of a
sexual harassment evidence shield.
1. Purported "Welcomeness" Reflects Power, Not Sex
The unwelcomeness requirement presupposes that harassers
and their victims are motivated by sexual attraction. While a woman
is not expected to appreciate derogatory and demeaning epithets
based solely upon her gender, the law assumes that, unless she indicates otherwise, she may be receptive to sexual advances or other
sexual behavior. Because men and women do not occupy equal positions of power in the workplace, however, receptiveness to sexual
attention may reflect intimidation rather than desire.9
Institutionally, women are at the mercy of their male supervisors. When job benefits, promotions, or even positive performance
reviews are conditioned upon acquiescence to harassment, welcomeness might reflect fear for the victim's job rather than acceptance.9 7

95. Notes of the Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 403. A primary objective in barring unfairly
prejudicial evidence is to preclude "inducing decision on a purely emotional basis." Id.
96. The disequilibrium of workplace power between the genders is reflected in the labor
statistics collected by the Bureau of the Census, Current Population Study. As of 1993, women
held 47.8% of the approximately 32 million "managerial and professional specialty" jobs in the
economy, yet only 42% of actual "executive" positions. U.S. Dep't. of Comm., Bureau of the
Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 1994 407 (114th ed. 1994).
Women constitute 18.6% of architects; 8.6% of engineers; 21.8% of physicians; 10.8% of
dentists; 42.5% of college and university teachers; and 22.9% of lawyers. Id. Conversely, in
1993 women held 63.8% of the positions considered "technical, sales and administrative
support" in the Current Population Survey. Id. at 408. Women comprised 99.3% of dental
hygienists; 79.6% of legal assistants; 96.2% of secretaries, stenographers, and typists; 97.2% of
receptionists; 82% of general office clerks; 88.4% of bank tellers; and 90.9% of bookkeeping,
accounting, and auditing clerks. Id. at 407-08.
Aside from the underrepresentation of women in positions of power, women continue to earn
less than men in the same occupations. As of 1993, the median weekly earnings of all male
workers was $514 while female workers earned $395. Id. at 429. Male managerial and
professional employees earn on average $791 per week compared with $580 for women. Id.
Male operators, fabricators, and laborers earn $399 in median weekly income while women in
the same category earn $288. Id.
97. Susan Estrich argues that the imposition of the unwelcomeness test in cases of quid
pro quo harassment is absurd because consent in the face of coercion is an impossibility. "Even
if you believe that I might freely consent to sex with my supervisor in some other circumstances,
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When a woman's professional future is based upon the decisions of
her male supervisor, she may accept, or at least not object to, his
advances. The crucial distinction, however, is that her actions are
borne of coercion and not attraction.
The power differential in the workplace manifests itself in
other ways. Because men constitute the majority of managers, the
remedial scheme designed by the employer to address issues of sexual
harassment may be infused with sexual stereotypes. If a woman does
indeed lodge a complaint with her employer, she may be told that she
is hypersensitive or that her own actions are to blame.98 The plaintiffs complaint may not be taken seriously,99 and, if it is, she may risk
further harassment or retaliation.100 Given the perceived futility and
costs of disclosing her harassment, the victim may elect instead to
suffer in silence.
Because they represent a particularly small minority in certain
professions, women may be subjected to harassment simply for
displaying the audacity to enter the male domain. When confronted
with women as co-workers, men working in traditionally maledominated professions may lash out, using sexually-explicit or
offensive conduct as their weapon. 101 Welcomeness is not an issue

can free will exist in the face of coercion? With a gun to my head, would you even ask about
philanthropy?" Estrich, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 831 (cited in note 27).
98. See Waltman v. InternationalPaper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff
told "she should expect this type of behavior working with men"); Hansel v. Public Service Co. of
Colorado, 778 F. Supp. 1126, 1129 (D. Colo. 1991) (plaintiff instructed to "work on your peer
relations" and to try to "fit in better"); Morris v. American Nat. Can Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1489,
1492 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (plaintiff told that alleged harassment amounted to nothing more than
"horseplay" and "pranks" and that "the conduct might stop if she didn't let it bother her so
much"), modified, 952 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1991).
99. See Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 416 n.1 (7th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff told by
supervisor to inform harasser that her husband had given her herpes); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d
251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (complainant told by supervisor to submit to harraser's advances).
100. Obviously, when the harasser is also the victim's supervisor, her job benefits may be
threatened or she may receive negative performance reviews and undue criticism. See, for
example, Drinkwater,904 F.2d at 855-56 (plaintiff's performance rating adjusted downward at
behest of supervisor); Walker v. SullairCorp., 736 F. Supp. 94, 97 (W.D. N.C. 1990) (supervisor
maintained negative fie on plaintiff and strenuously objected to affirmative evaluation by
another supervisor), modified, 946 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1991); Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d
1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1990) (complaints about supervisor precipitate criticism of work
performance and discipline for trivialities), vacated, 501 U.S. 1201 (1991), modified, 948 F.2d
532 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1294 (1992); Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 812
(10th Cir. 1989) (after plaintiff rejects his advances, supervisor scrutinizes her work more
closely than others and threatens her job security).
101. See, for example, Morris, 730 F. Supp. at 1490-91 (plaintiff asked "do you spit or
swallow" and whether she has lost a pair of women's underwear including a soiled sanitary
napkin); Hall, 842 F.2d at 1012 (male crew member urinated in plaintiffs water bottle).
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when such conduct occurs because it is purely reflective of power. 10 2
Finally, sexual harassment involving explicit or implicit threats of
violence 03 can never be said to be welcomed by the victim. 104

By

resorting to violence, the defendant belies any claim that his sexual
advances were welcome. If the purpose of the unwelcomeness test is
to prevent legitimately consensual workplace activity from being
called harassment, 5 it is inapplicable in this context.
When sexual harassment is based upon power and not upon
sex, evidence that the victim acquiesced is probative only of her recognition of the power differential existing between herself and her
harasser. Attempted showings of welcomeness may thus divert the
factfinder because submission to power may be misperceived as acceptance rather than as coerced submission.
2. The Analogy to Consent in Rape Cases
The rape shield rule of Former and Amended Rule 412 bars
use of the victim's sexual history as proof of consent in federal rape
prosecutions. While a detailed analysis of the efficacy of the rape
shield is beyond the scope of this Note,1 6 the enactment of the rule
represents an affirmative effort to limit the use of illegitimate
evidence and to curtail routine defense tactics similar to those used in
the sexual harassment context. During the congressional deliberations on Former Rule 412, it was suggested that the objectives of the
rule-the exclusion of irrelevant and/or prejudicial evidence-could be
achieved under the extant evidentiary rules relating to permissible

102. The Morris court recognized that fact in stating that harassment visited upon the
plaintiff "more likely than not [was] generated by the same animus that generated the note,
This is what you should be doing instead of a man's job.'" Morris, 730 F. Supp. at 1496.
103. See Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 61 (2nd Cir. 1992)
(plaintiff's arm grabbed so hard as to leave bruises); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486 (7th
Cir. 1991) (plaintiff physically hit in kidneys and maced); Brooms, 881 F.2d at 417. In Brooms,
"[Defendant] showed [plaintiff] one of several photocopies of a racist pornographic picture
involving bestiality. [Defendant] threatened that the picture depicted how she was going to end
up'" Id.
104. The problems associated with admitting the evidence of welcomeness in these
circumstances is analogous to the use of such evidence in the rape context. See Part I.B.2.
105. See Claypoole, 48 Ohio St. L. J. at 1155 (cited in note 49) (explaining that "[slexuallyoriented speech or activity can be considered legitimate if it is not coercive, is not offensive, and
is part of the customary and normal courtship process"); EEOC Policy Guidance, EEOC Compl.
Man. (CCH) 13114 at 3270 (cited in note 40) (stating that "sexual attraction may often play a
role in the day-to-day social exchange between employees").
106. The scholarship and case law discussing Former Rule 412 is quite large. For analysis
of the rule in its prior state, see generally Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the
State and FederalCourts: A Proposalfor the Second Decade, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 763 (1986).
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uses of character evidence. 10 7 This suggestion was rejected, and the
creation of Former Rule 412 thus reflects the willingness of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence to reform the rules when past
sexual experience is used improperly as character evidence.108
Although significant differences exist between the conduct of
sexual harassment trials and rape prosecutions, the concerns underlying the use of welcomeness and consent evidence are largely the
same.'09 First, the focus in sexual harassment cases, as in rape cases,
is often on the conduct of the complainant. Under the welcomeness
standard, the plaintiff, in claiming that she was offended, puts her
character in issue."0 Before the jury may assess the culpability of the
defendant, the plaintiff must overcome the attempt to link her past
conduct to her capacity for offense.
Second, the victim's past behavior may be the determinant of
her assent in both a sexual harassment trial and a rape prosecution.
The rape defendant may counter the victim's verbal protestations on
the occasion charged with evidence of her consent or provocative
107. O'Neill, 1989 U. Chi. Legal. F. at 222 n.18 (cited in note 49) (citing Hearing on H.R.
14666 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House
of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1976)).
108. In essence, notwithstanding the fact that the rape defendant faces the potential loss of
his liberty, Congress perceived that the need to protect rape victims' privacy outweighs the
defendant's right to unfettered use of past sexual history evidence. See Susan R. Klein,
Comment, A Survey of Evidence and Discovery Rules in Civil Sexual Harassment Suits with
Special Emphasis on CaliforniaLaw, 11 Indus. Rel. L. J. 540, 573 (1989) (discussing F.R.E. 412
and other rape shield laws that apply in criminal proceedings).
The debate concerning the constitutionality of the rape shield rule continues.
Commentators have argued that the Constitution confers a right on the criminal defendant to
introduce all defensive evidence that is relevant to the determination of his legal guilt or
innocence. Under this reasoning, "any restrictions on defense evidence that issue out of other
considerations than relevance-such as solicitude for the interests of victims and witnesses or
the extrinsic policy of encouraging them to come forward.. . -would have to fail." Paul F.
Rothstein, Federal Rules of Evidence: Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates136.13-14 (Clark, Boardman, Callaghan, 2d ed. 1994) (emphasis deleted).
For arguments regarding the constitutionality of Former Rule 412, see J. Alexander Tanford
and Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 544 (1980); David Haxton, Comment, Rape Shield Statutes: Constitutional Despite
UnconstitutionalExclusions of Evidence, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1219. See also Rothstein, Federal
Rules of Evidence at 1.36.14-15 (citing cases considering the constitutionality of Rule 412).
109. As stated by Susan Estrich, "fu]nwelcomeness has emerged as the doctrinal stepchild
of the rape standards of consent and resistance, and shares virtually all of their problems."
Estrich, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 827 (cited in note 27).
110. While the federal evidence rules prevent a sexual harassment defendant from
introducing the plaintiffs past sexual behavior to show a propensity for sexually explicit
conduct, the rules do allow the introduction of character evidence as proof of a subsidiary
element of a claim or offense. See F.R.E. 404(a) (setting forth the propensity rule) and F.R.E.
404(b) (allowing the introduction of character evidence for purposes other than to show action in
conformity). Part IV.B of this Note discusses how the defendant's showing of welcomeness
implicates the circumstantial use of character evidence for a non-propensity purpose governed
by F.R.E. 404(b).
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conduct on prior occasions. Similarly, because welcomeness is presumed in sexual harassment cases, the plaintiff's statements that
certain behavior offends her may not suffice. Her past conduct may
be consistent, in the defendant's eyes, with the presumption of welcomeness and the harassment may be excused on this basis.,' Unless
and until the plaintiff expresses her nonassent, the harassment may
continue even if the plaintiffs silence is borne of fear for her job.112
Finally, past sexual history is often introduced in rape and
sexual harassment trials for purposes other than to directly exculpate
the defendant. As in rape cases, if jurors become aware that the sexual harassment plaintiff has engaged in sexually explicit conduct in
the past, they may reach impermissible conclusions with respect to
the facts in issue. The jury may elect to punish the plaintiff for her
past behavior," 3 or, alternatively, the jury may infer that the plaintiff
has the propensity to invite sexual attention and that her character
does not lend itself to offense."1
The danger of jury overvaluation or misuse of sexual history
evidence was a primary consideration in the creation of Former Rule
412.115 The existence of an analogous danger in cases of sexual harassment militates strongly in favor of the extension of the rule to the

civil realm.116

111. "[U]nwelcomeness may be judged not according to what the woman meant, but by the
implication that the man felt entitled to draw. The ambiguity plainly exist(s) only in his
perception, not hers. The courts, however, privilege his interpretation." Estrich, 43 Stan. L.
Rev. at 829 (cited in note 27). See also, Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 532,
533 (N.D. IM. 1988), affid, 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that "[allthough Plaintiff
rejected [her boss's sexual overtures], her initial rejections were neither unpleasant nor
unambiguous, and gave [her boss] no reason to believe that his moves were unwelcome").
112. Estrich, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 828.
113. When evidence has the potential to suggest decision based upon factors other than
those in issue, the evidence should be excluded as unfairly prejudicial. See F.R.E. 403 and
accompanying Advisory Committee Note.
114. The finding of a "propensity" to welcome sexual attention violates the propensity rule
contained in F.R.E. 404. The inability or unwillingness of the courts to enforce the evidence
rules to prevent impermissible jury conclusions led to the development of Amended Rule 412.
As stated by the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, the creation of a sexual harassment
evidence shield is designed to "safeguard the alleged victim against... the infusion of sexual
innuendo into the factflnding process." Notes of Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 412.
115. As noted during the Congressional proceedings, "rape trials [have] become inquisitions
into the victim's morality, not trials of the defendant's innocence or guilt... ." 124 Cong. Rec.
H34912 (Oct. 10, 1978) (statement of Representative Holtzman).
116. "Of all the countervailing considerations permitted to be weighed against the
probative value of... proffered evidence, none is so vital to the correct outcome of the trial as
the consideration of jury overvaluation or misuse of evidence." O'Neill, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. at
238 (cited in note 49). By definition, evidence is unfairly prejudicial and must be excluded if it
leads to a decision on an improper basis. Notes of Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 403. Because
the courts refused to heed this requirement in respect of the misuse of sexual history evidence,
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Aside from the implicit illegitimacy of sexual history evidence,
the extrinsic policies of protecting rape victims' privacy and encouraging claim reporting also led to the enactment of Rule 412.117 These
dual policies also hold true with respect to the conduct of sexual harassment litigation. 118 The civil plaintiff files her claim often at a humiliating and degrading expense. 119 This loss of privacy leads inexo120
rably to the underreporting of sexual harassment offenses.
Given the singularity of evidentiary concerns underlying the
use of sexual history in both rape and sexual harassment litigation,
the creation of a civil evidence shield is a logical and necessary measure.121 Critics of the application of Rule 412 to civil cases object to the
extension of the rule on fairness grounds. They argue that the categorical exclusion of sexual history evidence denies the defendant
substantive legal rights. 122 If the defendant is barred from presenting
Congress interposed Former Rule 412. It is, therefore, logical to argue that when sexual history
evidence may be similarly misused in the civil context, the rule, or an analogue, should apply.
117. 124 Cong. Rec. H34912 (Oct. 10, 1978) (statement of Representative Holtzman).
118. See O'Neill, 1989 U. Chi. Legal. F. at 239-40 (cited in note 49). See also Part I
(discussing the underreporting of sexual harassment).
119. Concern for the need to protect the privacy of sexual harassment victims led the court
in Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983), to become one of the first advocates of
stronger limitations on the admissibility of sexual history evidence. "Without... protection
from the courts, employees whose intimate lives are unjustifiably and offensively intruded upon
in the workplace might face the 'Catch-22' of invoking their statutory remedy only at the risk of
enduring further intrusions into irrelevant details of their personal lives in discovery, and
presumably, in open court." Id. at 761.
120. O'Neill, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. at 240 (cited in note 49). The Priest court recognized the
potential for underreporting in noting that it was "deeply concerned that civil complaints based
on sexual harassment in the workplace will be similarly inhibited, if discovery tactics such as
the one used by defendant herein are allowed to flourish." Priest,98 F.R.D. at 762.
Moreover, those who engage in sexual harassment generally realize that their victims are
reluctant to report their offenses. Victims of sexual harassment who value their privacy are
therefore trapped by the fear of lodging a complaint. As Catherine MacKinnon has observed:
[Plart of the power held by perpetrators of sexual harassment is the threat of making
the sexual abuse public knowledge. This functions like blackmail in silencing the victim
and allowing the abuse to continue.... To add to their burden the potential of making
public their entire personal life, information that has no relation to the fact or severity
of the incidents complained of, is to make the law of this area implicitly complicit in the
blackmail that keeps victims from exercising their rights and to enhance the impunity of
perpetrators. In effect, it means open season on anyone who does not want their entire
intimate life available to public scrutiny.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourseson Life and Law 114-15 (Harvard
U., 1987).
121. See O'Neill, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. at 233-243; Juliano, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1577
(cited in note 4); Klein, 11 Indus. Rel. L. J. at 574 (cited in note 108).
122. Indeed, this was precisely the objection made by members of the Supreme Court when
Proposed Rule 412 was transmitted to Congress stripped of any reference to a civil evidence
shield. In a letter to Judge Gerry, Chair of the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference,
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, "[t]his Court recognized in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
... that evidence of an alleged victim's 'sexually provocative speech or dress' may be relevant in
workplace harassment cases, and some Justices expressed concern that the proposed
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necessary evidence to establish welcomeness, the plaintiff's prima
facie burden becomes much easier to meet. In addition, because the
civil plaintiff need 'only prove her case by a preponderance of the
evidence (rather than the prosecution's much stricter burden of showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case), an evidentiary
ban imposed on the defendant could unfairly slant the case in the
12
plaintiff's favor.
This objection presupposes that the ban on sexual history evidence, or at least the presumption against its use, will deny the defendant access to essential evidence. As enacted, however, Amended
Rule 412 excepts from the sexual harassment shield evidence of sexual behavior or sexual predisposition that is of sufficient probative
value.124 Therefore, while sexual harassment defendants now face a
comparatively more difficult burden in establishing welcomeness,
evidence that is truly probative of this issue remains well within their
reach.
Perhaps the strongest response to critics of a civil evidence
shield, however, is the creation and continued validity of Former and
Amended Rule 412's criminal evidence shield. The Federal Rules of
Evidence are designed to encourage the introduction and to compel
the admission of all relevant evidence. 25 Critics of reform provisions
like the rape shield rule assert that the extant evidence rules
incorporate issues common to all trials and that the rules, therefore,
should not develop differently for each substantive crime and civil
cause of action.

26

Yet, the Federal Rules of Evidence currently

include provisions tailoring the application of the rules to the
introduction of certain types of evidence.

27

When experience

demonstrates, therefore, that the gatekeeping function of Rule 403 is
inadequate to bar prejudicial evidence, more restrictive evidentiary
Categorical limitations on the
provisions are appropriate. 28
amendment might encroach on the rights of defendants" Communication from the Chief
Justice, House Document 103-250, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (cited in note 88).
123. Federal Courts Committee Report at 9 (cited in note 83).
124. F.R.E. 412(b)(2). Although neither the rule nor the accompanying Advisory
Committee Note offer concrete guidance on the operation of the subsection (b)(2) exception for
civil cases, the standard of admissibility under the subsection's balancing test is the subject
matter of Part IV of this Note.
125. "All relevant evidence is admissible." F.R.E. 402.
126. Tanford and Bocchino, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 551 (cited in note 108).
127. The basic rules of relevance and admissibility contained in Rules 401-403 are
supplemented by categorical rules of exclusion set forth in Rules 404-412. These categorical
exclusions were created to address "[tihe frequent recurrence of certain potentially prejudicial
situations." Eric D. Green and Charles R. Nesson, Problems, Cases and Materialson Evidence
133 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1994).
128. O'Neill, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. at 242 (cited in note 49).
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admissibility of evidence in response to the exigencies of a particular
offense are thus sanctioned by the federal rules themselves.
A final argument against the extension of the rape shield to
civil cases is that the complainants in rape and sexual harassment
offenses suffer different damages. 129 The rape victim has been
physically violated by means of violent, coerced submission. In
coming forward, she risks further psychological trauma. Under these
circumstances, evidence of the victim's past sexual history may be
justifiably excluded, given the severity of the offense and the need to
protect the victim's privacy and mental well-being. 1 0 Conversely,
sexual harassment plaintiffs suffer actual physical injuries only in the
most extreme cases. Their damages are primarily emotional and
comparatively less severe.1 3'
Moreover, the sexual harassment
plaintiff seeks compensation for her injuries rather than the
incarceration of a dangerous individual. The defendant's capacity to
show welcomeness should thus be a risk that the plaintiff must bear
in seeking monetary relief.3 2 Denying the defendant free access to
the plaintiff's sexual history would allow the plaintiff to trade, costfree, a comparatively slight degradation for a potentially large
33
economic reward.
This argument not only ignores the severe trauma caused by
workplace harassment, 1 4 but it also misconstrues the essential remedial purpose of Amended Rule 412. Although Former Rule 412 was
developed to serve the dual policies of protecting rape victims' privacy
and encouraging the reporting of rape offenses, 35 the rule's essential
purpose was to correct an illegitimate use of evidence. The recent
amendments to Rule 412 reflect the judgment that past sexual history
serves virtually no evidentiary function in either the rape or sexual

129. Indeed, the essential purpose of the welcomeness inquiry is to determine if the alleged
harassment victim suffered any damages at all. The welcomeness test purports to distinguish
appropriate from inappropriate advances. Radford, 72 N.C. L. Rev. at 541 (cited in note 41).
130. "Although all trials are invasive to some degree, seldom does the alleged need to
secure evidence justify intrusion into such an intimate sphere." O'Neill, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F.
at 230 (cited in note 49).
131. The judgment that sexual harassment is not pervasive and therefore of minimal
impact is an acutely male phenomenon. See Radford, 72 N.C. L. Rev. at 521-22 (cited in note
41) (discussing the gender-based "perception gap" regarding sexual harassment).
132. In essence, the "quid pro quo" of a meritless claim is the denial of relief.
133. Susan Estrich disputes this argument, noting that the additional prerequisites in
establishing both hostile work environment and quid pro quo harassment make a showing of
unwelcomeness unnecessary to legitimate the plaintiffs claim of sexual harassment. Estrich,
43 Stan. L. Rev. at 826-27 (cited in note 27).
134. The trauma of sexual harassment often leads the victim to remain silent because she
blames herself for the misconduct. Gutek, Sex and the Workplace at 72 (cited in note 11).
135. See note 117 and accompanying text.
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harrassment contexts. That is, it makes a material fact, either welcomeness or consent, more or less probable only under quite limited
circumstances. Past sexual conduct is thus properly barred from
admission because it is not probative of immediate sexual desire and
its prejudicial impact is devastating.
The evidence rules reflect the belief that all relevant evidence
bears on the truth of a matter in controversy and, as such, should be
admissible at trial."s8 While Rule 403 is normally the arbiter of
admissibility, when the evidence involved implicates a categorical rule
of exclusion, the balance between probativeness and prejudice has
already been made. Congress, in creating Former Rule 412, authoritatively resolved the dispute concerning the relative probative value
and prejudicial impact of sexual history evidence offered by defendants in rape prosecutions. This calculation is categorical and is
implicated whenever evidence of past sexual conduct is offered to
prove the invitation or provocation of sexual misconduct. A civil
evidence shield is a necessary and logical concomitant of the rape
shield rule, for, if a criminal evidence shield can withstand the counterweight of the defendant's liberty interest, a civil evidence shield is
137
justifiable when only the defendant's pocketbook is at stake.
The analogy between consent and welcomeness and, by extension, rape and sexual harassment, supports unification of the evidentiary provisions governing these causes of action. If the use of sexual
history evidence is restricted in one offense, it should be similarly
limited when offered for the same purpose in the other. The inherent
infirmities that render past sexual behavior inadequate as proof in
rape prosecutions are also present when sexual history is offered to
show welcomeness.138 It is unremarkable, therefore, that an evidentiary mechanism that has reformed abuses in the criminal context
should be implemented to preclude similar abuses in civil cases involving sexual misconduct.

136. F.R.E. 401 and 402. Relevance is determined by probative value which is in turn
defined as the tendency of an item of evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to
prove. Cleary, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 185 at 541 (cited in note 78). Admittedly relevant,
and therefore probative, evidence may be excluded from trial, however, if its potential for
prejudice to the nonoffering party outweighs its probative value. F.R.E. 403.
137. Klein, 11 Indus. Rel. L. J. at 574 (cited in note 108).
138. The Priestcourt recognized early on the evidentiary linkages between rape and sexual
harassment: "It is often said, that those who do not learn from history are condemned to repeat
it. By carefully examining our experience with rape prosecutions, however, the courts and bar
can avoid repeating in this new field of civil sexual harassment suits the same mistakes that are
now being corrected [by Rule 412] in the rape context." Priest,98 F.R.D. at 762.
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3. Evidence of the Plaintiffs Sexual History Is
Not Probative of Welcomeness
The prejudicial impact of sexual history evidence is undeniable. The introduction of prior sexual conduct entices the factfinder to
infer that the victim of workplace harassment is an unchaste and
immoral woman and thus somehow undeserving of protection. 139 Yet,
while the prejudicial effect of sexual history evidence is certainly a
factor in weighing its admissibility, 140 most courts continue to evalu-

ate the validity of such evidence based upon considerations of relevance and probativeness.'1, The conception that the victim's past
conduct is reflective of her receptiveness on the occasion charged,
however, perpetuates some of the most pernicious stereotypes undermining the effectiveness of sexual harassment law.
Guided by Meritor, courts attempt to distinguish sexually explicit behavior that is demonstrative of welcomeness from that which
is not. The courts often fail at this task because the past sexual be42
havior of the plaintiff objectifies her in the eyes of the court.
Certainly she is the type of woman who would welcome sexual harassment (or at least not be offended by it) because she has been sexually aggressive in the past.143 Thus, it is only the bad woman who is a
139. In her last, unfimished manuscript, Mary Joe Frug describes the phenomenon whereby
the sexual harassment legal rules withhold protection based upon considerations of
welcomeness as the "sexualization of the female body." Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist
Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1050 (1992). "Sexualization...
occurs, paradoxically, in the application of... sexual harassment laws that are designed to
protect women against sex-related injuries. These rules grant or deny women protection by
interrogating their sexual promiscuity. The more sexually available or desiring a woman [has
been] the less protection these rules are likely to give her." Id.
140. The Advisory Committee Note to Amended Rule 412 ensures that considerations of
prejudicial impact will remain primary in determining the admissibility of sexual history
evidence. "This amendment is designed to exclude evidence that does not directly refer to
sexual activities or thoughts but that the proponent believes may have a sexual connotation for
the factfimder. Admission of such evidence would contravene Rule 412's objectives of shielding
the alleged victim from potential embarrassment and safeguarding the victim against
stereotypical thinking." Note of Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 412.
141. This is understandable because the Meritor welcomeness standard casts a wide net for
proof of invitation or provocation. See notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
142. See Estrich, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 830 (cited in note 27) (arguing that the welcomeness
test forces the factfinder to "see women only as the sexual objects of men").
143. Susan Estrich laments the continued misperception that sexual history evidence is
generally probative of welcomeness. She argues that the opportunity to prove welcomeness,
sanctioned by Meitor,reinforces some of the most demeaning sexual stereotypes of women. Id.
at 826. This effect is particularly regrettable in light of the opportunity for reform presented by
the creation of sexual harassment as a valid cause of action under Title VII. Professor Estrich
states that:
Given their recent vintage, sexual harassment suits presented unique opportunities to
shape the cause of action with a heightened awareness of the traditional sexist doctrines
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victim of sexual harassment, because, as the courts tell us, she really
must have wanted it.'"
This argument rests on the assumption that sexual conduct is
fungible. Manifestations of sexuality by a complainant prompt the
conclusion that she is available to all men. In Weiss v. Amoco Oil
Co., 14 for example, the court found that discovery of a woman's past

sexual conduct with coworkers was permissible because it allowed the
harasser to prove that his actions were welcomed, or at least that he
thought they were welcomed, by the complainant. 146 Implicit in the
Weiss court's analysis is the assumption that assent to sexual relations with certain individuals translates into a prospective desire for
sexual contact.
The assumption that past sexual conduct is fungible and therefore relevant to welcomeness also underlies the court's opinion in
Mitchell v. Hutchings.14 7 In deciding whether the defendants in a

sexual harassment action could depose the plaintiffs' former and
current sexual partners, 48 the court declined to deny outright such a
discovery request. 49 Rather, the court concluded that the plaintiffs'
past sexual history could, if known by the alleged harasser, "establish
the context of the relationship between plaintiffs and [the defendant]
and may have a bearing on what conduct [the defendant] thought was
....The fact that many federal courts jettison such opportunities daily, that the worst
of rape litigation stands more as an example followed than one rejected, is the most
persuasive and painful evidence of the durability of sexism in the law's judgment of the
sexual relations of men and women.
Id. at 816.
144. Christina A. Bull, Comment, The Implications of Admitting Evidence of a Sexual
HarassmentPlaintiffsSpeech and Dress in the Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 41
UCLA L. Rev. 117, 146 (1993) (quoting Phyllis Schlafly's argument that "[flor the virtuous
woman, sexual harassment is not a problem").
145. 142 F.R.D. 311 (S.D. Iowa 1992).
146. Id. at 316. In Weiss, the plaintiff had been terminated by Amoco after allegations of
sexual harassment were made against him. The plaintiff, charging wrongful termination,
sought discovery of his accuser's sexual history. Id. at 312. In ruling on the accuser's motion for
a protective order, the court declined to apply Iowa's sexual harassment evidence shield in the
context of a wrongful termination claim, stating that the Iowa provision "is not a prophylactic
rule which restricts... discovery in all civil cases." Id. at 314. See Iowa Code Ann. § 668.15(1)
(West Supp. 1994) (stating that in a civil sexual abuse case "a party seeking discovery of
information concerning the plaintiff's sexual conduct. . . must establish specific facts showing
good cause for that discovery"). Relying instead upon the broad discovery mandate of F.R.C.P.
26(b)(1) and the assertion in Meritor that sexual history is relevant to the assessment of
welcomeness, the court determined that Weiss' accuser had failed to meet her burden of
establishing the necessity of a protective order. Id. at 315-17.
147. 116 F.R.D. 481 (D. Utah 1987).
148. Id. at 483. The defendants sought to depose "a photographer who ha[d] allegedly
taken sexually suggestive pictures of one or more of the plaintiffs" and a coworker of one of the
plaintiffs who had allegedly been fondled by her. Id.
149. Id. at 484.
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welcome."15 The implication is that proof of a complainant's prior
sexual activity, if known by the defendant, is inherently suggestive of
welcomeness. Welcomeness in one context merges with and becomes
indistinguishable from alleged welcomeness in a later context.
While most courts reject this analysis with respect to the

plaintiffs interactions with third parties, 151 past sexually explicit
activity with the alleged harasser is generally considered to be highly
probative of welcomeness.152 In Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative
Action, 53 the court refused to consider the defendant's advances as
unwelcome, given the plaintiffs "flirtatious" behavior toward the
defendant. 5 ' Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiff frequently
complimented the defendant on his appearance, straightened his tie,
moved her body "in a provocative manner" around the defendant and
"otherwise acted unprofessionally."55 This behavior ultimately vitiated the plaintiffs capacity to claim offense.15 Similarly, in Sardigal
v. St. Louis Nati. Stockyards Co.,157 the court ruled that the plaintiffs
prior contact with the defendant precluded a claim of unwelcome
harassment.'5 The court reasoned that if the conduct charged by the

150. Id. Although the court ultimately denied the defendants' discovery request, reasoning
that "evidence of sexual conduct which is remote in time or place to plaintiffs' working
environment is irrelevant," the plaintiffs' past sexual history would be "obviously relevant"
simply if known by the defendant. Id.
151. See Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Fresno Hilton Hotel, 1984 WL
54283 (Cal. F.E.H.C.). In refusing to admit evidence of a sexual harassment victim's past sexual
history, the California Fair Employment & Housing Commission reasoned that even if the
complainant engaged in sexual banter with men other than her alleged harasser and had a
number of sexual partners, it would not follow that the sexual overtures of another individual
would not offend her. Id. at *15-16. As stated by the Commission, to find otherwise, "we would
have to believe that the emotional responses of harassment victims are fungible and
indistinguishable. Furthermore, we would also have to accept the absurd and deeply offensive
notion that a woman's consensual conduct with some individuals negates her right to say 'no' to
the same or similar conduct with others." Id. at *16.
152. See Bigoni v. Pay' Pak Stores, 48 FEP Cases (BNA) 732, 734 (D. Ore. 1988)
(permitting discovery by employer of plaintiffs sexual relations with her alleged harasser);
Evans v.Mail Handlers, 32 FEP Cases (BNA) 634, 637 (D. D.C. 1983) (concluding that the
plaintiffs allegations of unwelcome sexual advances were unfounded given the existence of a
consensual sexual relationship between the parties up to the time of plaintiffs termination).
But see Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774, 779-80 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that
the plaintiff was subject to unwelcomed sexual harassment notwithstanding the fact that she
had maintained a voluntary, consensual sexual relationship with the defendant several years
earlier).
153. 536 F. Supp. 1149 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
154. Id. at 1164.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1177.
157. 42 FEP Cases 497 (BNA) (S.D. II. 1986).
158. Id. at 502.
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plaintiff did indeed occur, she would have ceased any voluntary asso159
ciation with the defendant.
Although the relevance of sexual history evidence may be
greater if the parties have engaged in prior sexual relations,160 the use
of such evidence in virtually any context is inherently degrading to
women. When the proffered evidence involves relations between the
plaintiff and third parties, the implication is that the plaintiffs availability to one man is transferable to all men. When the evidence reflects past sexual contact between the parties the assumption is that
prior assent cannot be withdrawn.
The relevance of prior sexually provocative behavior is explicitly sanctioned in Meritor. 11 By suggesting that the plaintiffs sexually explicit conduct is relevant in a sexual harassment claim, the
Meritor Court implied that, in effect, women are responsible for the
sexual behavior of their harassers.162 Welcomeness, then, becomes a
matter to be assessed by the harasser rather than the victim. 6 3 The

relevant inquiry is not what the woman intended to express by her
behavior, but rather what the defendant interpreted it to mean.'6
159. Id. at 501. The court stated, "If the plaintiff had been subjected to the type of
outrageous conduct described by her she would not voluntarily be in the company of the culprit,
much less voluntarily visit him, and most incomprehensible of all, allow him to come into her
home at night after he had threatened to rape her. This defies belief." Id.
160. Prior sexual relations between the parties are a perverse influence, however, because
the existence of prior sexual contact may divert the factfinder from the events in question.
Evidence arguably probative of welcomeness may thus confuse the issue.
161. Bull, 41 UCLA L. Rev. at 144 (cited in note 144)
162. Childers, 42 Duke L. J. at 874 (cited in note 49). The courts adopt the perspective of
male harassers in concluding that it is the female victim who bears ultimate responsibility for
the alleged harassment. See McLean v. Satellite Technology Services, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1458,
1459-60 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (stating that because the plaintiff "possessed a lusty libido and was no
paragon of virtue ... it is [the] plaintiff who bears the responsibility for whatever sexually
suggestive conduct is involved in this case"); Gan v. Kepro CircuitSystems, 28 FEP Cases (BNA)
639, 640 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (finding that any propositions that occurred were prompted by the
plaintiffs own sexual aggressiveness and sexually explicit conversations); Honea v. SGS Control
Services, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (denying summary judgment on the
plaintiff's claim because the fact that she wore no bra to work and presented roses to male
coworkers presented a genuine issue of fact as to welcomeness).
163. The resulting effect, of course, is that the harasser will not view his conduct as
offensive. Donna L. Laddy, Comment, Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries: A Per Se Rule
Against Admitting Evidence of General Sexual Expressions as a Defense to Sexual Harassment
Claims, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 939, 959 (1993). Studies indicate that a perception gap exists between
men and women regarding the offensive nature of sexual advances in the workplace. Barbara
Gutek found that 67.2% of men as compared to 16.8% of women would be "flattered" by the
invitation to have sex with a coworker while 15% of men and 62.8% of women would be insulted
by such a request. Gutek, Sex and the Workplace at 96 (cited in note 11).
164. The defendant's interpretations are licensed by his knowledge of the plaintiffs sexual
history. In Mitchell v. Hutchings, for example, the court refused to admit evidence of the
plaintiffs sexual history on the basis that such evidence was too "remote" from the pending
claim to be relevant. 116 F.R.D. at 484. Remoteness, however, is a function of the defendant's
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Courts, therefore, require women who have engaged in sexually suggestive conduct to provide affirmative notice of offense to their harassers in order to overcome the presumption of welcomeness.165
Imposing a duty to warn of unwelcomeness, however, reinforces the conventional, repressive view of women's sexuality that
pervades the law of sexual harassment. 166 It is reflective of the sexual

stereotyping that grounds judicial conceptions of what constitutes
offensive conduct.17 When women engage in sexual banter in the
knowledge, and, had the defendant merely been aware of the plaintiffs' sexual history, it would
be available to him in his defense. Id.
Similarly, in Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983), a case widely cited for its progressive
assessment of the relevance of sexual history evidence, the Fourth Circuit concluded that "[a]
person's private and consensual sexual activities do not constitute a waiver of his or her legal
protections against unwelcomed and unsolicited sexual harassment." Id. at 254 n.3. This
sentence is immediately preceded, however, by the court's assertion that there was no evidence
that the defendants were aware of the plaintiffs use of nicknames with possible sexual
connotations. Id.
165. See, for example, Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian,Miss., 633 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 n.8
(S.D. Miss. 1986), affrd mem., 824 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1987) (1988) (asserting that the plaintiffs
participation in the conduct leading to an allegedly hostile work environment would not bar a
claim of sexual harassment provided that she is "able to identify with some precision a point at
which she made known to her co-workers or superiors that such conduct would hencefore [sic]
be considered offensive"); Vermett v. Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587, 599 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (stating
that the plaintiff could exclude herself from allegedly harassing activities simply by saying that
she did not "like" the activities); Ukarish v. Magnesium Electron, 31 FEP Cases (BNA) 1315,
1321 (D. N.J. 1983) (holding that the plaintiffs private indications of offense in her diary were
insufficient to demonstrate unwelcomeneness).
Nadine Taub, plaintiffs attorney in Tomkins v. PublicService Electric and Gas Co., 568 F.2d
1044 (3d Cir. 1976), argues that, except in extreme cases, the absence of an objective measure
with which to judge the effect of harassment makes it "seemi] fair to require as a general matter
that the woman attempt to make known to the harasser that she finds his conduct offensive."
Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment
Discrimination,21 B.C. L. Rev. 345, 375-76 (1980). The EEOC has also adopted this position,
stating that, in assessing unwelcomeness, the agency's "investigation should determine whether
the victim's conduct is consistent, or inconsistent, with her assertion that the sexual conduct is
unwelcome." EEOC: Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment (March 19, 1990) BNA Fair
Employment Practices 405:6681, 6686. In making this determination, "[i]nvestigators and
triers of fact [should] rely on objective evidence, rather than subjective, uncommunicated
feelings." Id. at 405:6686 n.10 (emphasis added).
In addition to communication with the harasser, the courts also look to whether the victim
has reported alleged misconduct to her employer as a gauge of unwelcomeness. See Highlander
v. K.F.C. National Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 646, 650 (6th Cir. 1986); Scott v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1986); Neville v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 42 FEP
Cases (BNA) 1314, 1317 (W.D. N.Y. 1987), afld mem., 857 F.2d 1461 (2d Cir. 1987) (concluding
that because plaintiff did not report any of the alleged incidents of harassment to management
until she was facing termination, the incidents either did not occur or were not considered
significant by plaintiff); Spencer v. General Electric Co., 697 F. Supp. 204, 210 (E.D. Va. 1988)
(describing plaintiffs failure to complain about any alleged assaults for more than two years as
"particularly telling").
166. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1183, 1203-09 (1989).
167. See Estrich, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 830-31 (cited in note 27) (arguing that the standard of
judgement in sexual harassment is "painfully male"); Bull, 41 UCLA Rev. at 144 (cited in note
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workplace, participate in sexual innuendo, or tell vulgar jokes, they
1 It is presumed that
waive any claim that they have been harassed. 68
the workplace may be inundated with sexual innuendo. 16 9 Yet when
women elect to conform to the behavioral standards of the workplace,
such activity may be fatal to their claims of sexual harassment.1 70
When male plaintiffs talk about their sexual experiences, it is ig72
nored; 7 ' when women disclose their sexual history, it is highlighted.
Men's use of vulgar language is treated as "poor word choice,' 173 while
a woman's use of the same language constitutes an invitation to
harassment 7 4
When men give sexually explicit gifts, it is

144) (stating that "[c]ourts interpret the behavior of women at work with [a] sexual framework.
. that] cast[s] women as sexual receivers and men as sexual initiators"); Childers, 42 Duke L.
J. at 872-73 (cited in note 49) (arguing that the Meritor Court's ambiguous definition of
unwelcomeness promotes the use of gender stereotypes by the lower courts).
168. See Gan, 28 FEP Cases at 641 (holding that the plaintiff substantially welcomed the
harassing conduct because she "actively contributed to the distasteful working environment by
her own profane and sexually suggestive conduct"); Vermett, 627 F. Supp. at 599, 605 (citing the
EEOC Guidelines on sexual harassment in support of the argument that the "context" within
which the alleged incidents occurred must be considered and that the context of the instant case
involved the plaintiff's participation in sexual joking and vulgarity).
169. As stated by the Sixth Circuit in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.:
[Ilt cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments, humor and language
are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines
may abound. Title VII was not meant to-or can-change this. It must never be
forgotten that Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the struggle for equal
employment opportunity for the female workers of America. But it is quite different to
claim that Title VII was designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social
mores of American workers.
805 F.2d 611, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting the district court opinion).
170. Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 486-87, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff
welcomed the alleged misconduct because she "not only experienced the depravity [of her
coworkers] with amazing resilience, but she also relished reciprocating in kind').
171. See Showalter v. Allison Reed Group Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (D. R.I. 1991), affd
sub nom. Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 984 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1993) (dismissing as
irrelevant to their claims of sexual harassment the repeated workplace disclosures by two male
claimants of their sexual exploits).
172. See Walker v. SullairCorp., 736 F. Supp. 94, 98 (W.D. N.C. 1990), modified, 946 F.2d
888 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding plaintiffs discussions about her sex life and sexual fantasies and
reports regarding the sexual content of her dates to be relevant to welcomeness).
173. See Young v. Mariner Corp., 56 Emp. Prac. Dec. 40,814 at 67,285 (N.D. Ala. 1991)
(explaining that "[tihe Court is not concerned with whether [defendant] described [plaintiffs]
attitude problem in 'locker room' parlance ...or whether he used more polite language. 'Locker
room' parlance would demonstrate a poor choice of words on [defendant's] part, but... [would].
confirm [0 that [defendant]... believed that [plaintiff] had a poor attitude").
174. See Loftin-Boggs, 633 F. Supp. at 1327 (explaining that "[pilaintiff admitted at trial
that she cursed and used vulgar language while at work... Any harassment plaintiff received
relating to her relationship with [defendant] was prompted by her own actions, including her
tasteless joking"); Gan, 28 FEP Cases at 640 (stating that "[a]ny such propositions that did occur
were prompted by [plaintiffs] own sexual aggressiveness and her own sexually-explicit
conversations").
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irrelevant; 17 5 when women do the same, it supports a finding of
176
welcomeness.
Despite the fact that courts view a woman's participation in
certain types of workplace conduct as probative of welcomeness, in
reality, women join in workplace sexual banter and innuendo for
reasons entirely unrelated to welcomeness. 177 Most women seek acceptance by their male peers as equals. This generally means behaving as men do. 78 Ironically, women's attempts to "fit in," to narrow
the divide between themselves and their male coworkers are often
used by the courts to further separate the sexes. In the end, the
courts punish women for the type of behavior that is demanded in the
79
workplace.
The fact that the courts continue to view a woman's sexually
explicit conduct as probative of welcomeness &uggeststhat an adjustment in perspective is required.180 What is demanded, and what has

175. See Showalter, 767 F. Supp. at 1208.
176. See Reed, 939 F.2d at 487.

177. This does not mean that a particular woman's sexually explicit conduct does not
accurately reflect her personality and attitudes about sexual expression. While a woman may

be said to have welcomed "reciprocal" or "proportionate" sexually provocative behavior, it is
another thing entirely to conclude that she knowingly invited more extreme forms of
harassment.
178. As one plaintiff stated: "ilt was real important for me to be accepted. It was
important for me to be a police officer and if that was the only way that I could be accepted, I
would just put up with it and [keep] my mouth shut." Reed, 939 F.2d at 492 (quoting trial
record).
179. Bull, 41 UCLA L. Rev. at 145 (cited in note 144); Estrich, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 830-31
(cited in note 27).
180. Many commentators have endorsed the continued evolution of the "reasonable
woman" standard first enunciated in Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the
Ellison standard, the court is required to adopt a woman's perspective in evaluating the alleged
misconduct. The plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment
harassment by showing "conduct which a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment."
Id. at 879. The reasonable woman standard, its supporters argue, would effectively bypass the
"perception gap" that hinders effective adjudication of sexual harassment claims. See Abrams,
42 Vand. L. Rev. at 1203 (cited in note 166) (stating that "[hiostile environment doctrine must
begin from an understanding of the way in which those practices challenged as sexual
harassment are likely to be experienced differently by women than by men").
This Note does not examine the reasonable woman standard because its adoption would
only partially address the concerns raised by defendants' use of sexual history evidence. While
the reasonable woman standard may broaden the range of activities that constitute sexual
harassment, its application is only tangentially related to welcomeness. Even if, after adoption
of the reasonable woman standard, employers would face increased liability under Title VII,
they would, if sued, continue to use the plaintiff's past sexual history in the effort to establish
welcomeness. The reforms associated with the reasonable woman standard are therefore
distinguishable from those embodied by the amendments to Rule 412. The reasonable woman
standard seeks to widen the scope of activities constituting harassment, while Amended Rule
412 controls the evidence offered to prove that the plaintiff nonetheless welcomed an even
broader range of harassment.
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been provided by Amended Rule 412, is an authoritative recasting of
what constitutes relevant evidence of welcomeness. Under the new
rule, only in limited circumstances will the plaintiffs sexual history
be probative. These circumstances are discussed below in Part IV.
4. Policy Reasons in Support of a Sexual Harassment Evidence Shield
Plaintiffs who assert claims of sexual misconduct in the workplace are deserving of protection. While Title VII incorporates an
administrative model of sexual harassment adjudication wherein the
EEOC is primarily responsible for the initial processing, investigation, and certification of claims,181 it is the private plaintiff who is

ultimately responsible for the prosecution of her grievance. 18 2 Because
183
private litigants generally pursue claims of workplace harassment,
the private cause of action flowing from a right to sue notice is the
fundamental means of enjoining illegal employment practices involving sexual misconduct. Individual claimants are therefore instrumental to the effective enforcement of Title VII.
The law should accord sexual harassment plaintiffs greater
protection because they are the guarantors of a fundamental civil
right-the right to be free from unwelcome sexual advances in the
workplace. A sexual harassment suit is thus distinguishable from
other civil actions because the plaintiff seeks the vindication of a
public as well as private interest.M Beyond the limited resources of
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988) (discussing enforcement provisions for equal
employment claims).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) provides that the charging party may seek a right-to-sue

notice from the EEOC both if the Commission has dismissed the complaint or if the Commission
has found reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true but has failed to fie a civil action
against the respondent. The Supreme Court has held that the actions of the EEOC should not
prejudice the charging party's right to judicial determination of the merits of her claim.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973). The issuance of a right-to-sue
notice is therefore not a matter subject to the discretion of the Commission. Both the statute
and applicable regulations require the Commission to issue a right to sue letter upon the
charging party's request. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1994). See also Jones v.
United Gas Improvement Corporation,383 F. Supp. 420, 424 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (stating that the
issuance of a right to sue letter is a "ministerial act required both by the statute and applicable
regulations").
183. While Title VII permits the EEOC to institute a civil action against a respondent if a
satisfactory conciliation agreement cannot be reached, 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(f)(1), the volume and
diversity of employment discrimination claims filed with the Commission preclude effective use
of this mechanism. See generally Prepared Testimony of Janice Goodman, Vice President, The
National Employment Lawyers Association before the House Subcommittee on Select Education
and Civil Rights, Federal News Service, July 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Fednew file (stating that the EEOC's backlog of investigations for 1993 had reached over 85
cases and that 97% of federal actions are filed by private attorneys or pro se).
184. Klein, 11 Indus. Rel. L. J. at 574 (cited in note 108).
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the EEOC, the only way to effectuate public policy is to ensure the
maintenance of a private right of action to address workplace harassment. 185 If plaintiffs are intimidated or harassed in the prosecution of their claims, society loses in equal measure with the individual
victim. 1' When the underlying provisions of sexual harassment law
deny vindication of valid claims of employment discrimination, more
explicit protections are required.
In addition to the policy goals served by the creation of a sexual harassment evidence shield, a presumption against the use of
sexual history evidence is also of practical importance. Defendants'
attempts to introduce questionable and embarrassing evidence wastes
the time and resources of the parties and the courts. 87 While the
Meritor welcomeness standard invites a broad range of proof, evidence
that is clearly not probative and highly prejudicial should be presumptively barred from litigation. The civil evidence shield contained
in Amended Rule 412 narrows the scope of evidence that is admissible
under a welcomeness theory and allows the courts and the parties to
focus more effectively on the plaintiff's prima facie showing of unwelcomeness.
The enactment of a sexual harassment evidence shield is,
therefore, in accordance with public policy and practical necessity. It
encourages plaintiffs to enforce, through a private cause of action, the
remedial scheme of Title VII, and it protects them when they do so. It
does not foreclose access to truly probative evidence, yet it sensitizes
the courts to the need for closer scrutiny of proof of welcomeness.
IV. THE STANDARD OF ADMISSIBLE PROOF OF WELCOMENESS UNDER

THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT EVIDENCE SHIELD
A. Policy and Scope ofAmended Rule 412 in Cases of Sexual
Harassment
As the Advisory Committee note makes clear, Amended Rule
412 serves dual policies. The sexual harassment evidence shield is
designed to protect plaintiffs' privacy, thereby encouraging them to

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Bull, 41 UCLA L. Rev. at 134-35 (cited in note 144).
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file and pursue legal claims against alleged offenders. 188 In making
the encouragement of sexual harassment actions an objective of the
rule's incorporation of civil cases, the drafters acknowledge the fact
that discovery and admission of proof of welcomeness is a barrier for
potential claimants, leaving workplace harassment substantially
underreported. The extrinsic policies of the civil evidence shield are
therefore identical to the policy objectives that grounded the rape
shield rule. The presumptive ban on sexual behavior and sexual predisposition evidence serves to safeguard victims' privacy and to provide an incentive for the prosecution of claims. The civil evidence
189
shield is thus a mechanism to aid in the enforcement of Title VII.
By removing the prospect of embarrassment and further harassment
from the calculus of potential plaintiffs, Amended Rule 412 empowers
them to pursue the private cause of action that is the primary means
of enjoining sexual harassment under Title VII.
The second policy objective of the amendments to Rule 412 is
intrinsic to the law of evidence. The Advisory Committee Note refers
to the "sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of
intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the
fact-finding process"190 as the primary dangers that the civil evidence
shield is designed to address. Reference to sexual stereotyping reflects the assessment that evidence of the victim's sexual history is of
minor probative value because it is filtered through the factf'mder's
preconceived notions of proper sexual expression. In essence, sexual
stereotyping leads finders of fact 19' to overvalue the probative quality
of evidence that is offered as proof of welcomeness. In limiting the
range of admissible evidence, then, the drafters of the rule acknowledge that affirmative evidentiary guidelines are necessary to encourage proper assessments of probative worth.

188. Notes of Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 412 (explaining that "[by affording victims
protection in most instances, the rule ... encourages victims of sexual misconduct to institute
and to participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders").
189. While the effective enforcement of Title VII is an objective of Amended Rule 412, the
drafters also acknowledge that the victim's access to relief is a primary goal: "There is a strong
social policy in not only punishing those who engage in sexual misconduct, but also in providing
relief to the victim. Thus, Rule 412 applies in any civil case in which a person claims to be the

victim of sexual misconduct, such as actions for sexual battery or sexual harassment." Id.
190. Id.
191. It is interesting to note that when the Advisory Committee commentary refers to the

dangers of sexual stereotyping, it does not designate which entities within the factfinding
process are likely to subscribe to stereotypical conceptions of sexual expression. The implication
is that, in referring to sexual stereotyping, the drafters of the rule considered that both the
courts and the public require guidance concerning the probative quality of certain modes of
proof of welcomeness.
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The rule's goal of delimiting the impact of sexual innuendo in
the factfinding process implicitly recognizes the fact that evidence
offered to prove welcomeness is often highly prejudicial and therefore
very damaging. Sexual "innuendo" is not proof of a matter in controversy, but rather the use of sexually explicit evidence for its effect
upon the factfimder. Jurors aware of the plaintiff's sexual history may
seek to punish her and reject her claim, or they may conclude that she
lacks the capacity for offense. The highly prejudicial nature of sexual
history evidence is clearly recognized by Amended Rule 412, not only
in the Advisory Committee commentary, but also in the text of the
Rule itself. The probative value of evidence that surmounts the rule's
presumptive ban must "substantially outweigh" its prejudicial impact. 192 Sexual history evidence therefore faces a higher threshold of
relevancy because its potential to arouse the prejudices of the factfinder has been demonstrated in the case law.
While Amended Rule 412 serves the dual policies of curing
illegitimate uses of evidence and safeguarding victims' privacy, its
proscriptions are not reciprocal. The defendant in a sexual harassment claim may not invoke the sexual harassment evidence shield.
Employment of the rule's presumptive ban is reserved for those who
"can reasonably be characterized as a 'victim of alleged sexual misconduct.' 193 Subject to the limitations of the other evidence rules,
then, the sexual harassment plaintiff may seek to introduce the defendant's past sexual conduct without the defendant benefiting from
the protections afforded by the Amended Rule.
Amended Rule 412, in barring both evidence of sexual behavior
and sexual predisposition, incorporates the entire spectrum of proof
that defendants have sought to offer under a theory of welcomeness.
The Advisory Committee commentary provides definitions of both
"behavior194 and "predisposition' ' 95 that make clear that the rule
applies to all modes of sexually explicit conduct offered in evidence.
The presumptive ban of the civil evidence shield is not confined
to the actual offer of proof, however, for the drafters intended that the
considerations embodied by the Amended Rule also guide the conduct
192. The "reverse" balancing test of subdivision (b)(2) of the rule is discussed below in Part
1V.C.
193. Notes of the Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 412.
194. "Past sexual behavior connotes all activities that involve actual physical conduct, i.e.
sexual intercourse and sexual contact, or that imply sexual intercourse or sexual contact ....
In addition, the word 'behavior' should be construed to include activities of the mind, such as
fantasies or dreams." Id. (citations omitted).
195. Sexual predisposition is "evidence that does not directly refer to sexual activities or
thoughts, but that the proponent believes may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder." Id.
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of discovery.196 Although the text of the rule does not explicitly address discovery issues, the Advisory Committee commentary asserts
that the courts should enter appropriate protective orders pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) "[i]n order not to undermine the
rationale of Rule 412." 197 Rule 26 permits discovery of inadmissible

evidence, yet the evidence must be "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence."'19 8 A presumption in favor of the
issuance of protective orders is reasonable because the discovery of a
complainant's sexual history, given the proscriptions of Amended Rule
412, will not lead to the further discovery of admissible evidence. 99
Amended Rule 412 is thus intended to apply to the range of
evidence-gathering and -admitting functions provided by the federal
civil justice system. The sexual harassment evidence shield is designed to address the evidentiary problems of prejudice and low probative value associated with the admission of proof of the plaintiffs
sexual history. It also serves as a mechanism to aid in the enforcement of Title VII, and, as such, its protections are limited to the actual victims of workplace harassment.
B. Modes of ProofExcepted from the Sexual Harassment
Evidence Shield by Rule 412(b)(2)
The amendments to Rule 412 disposed of the explicit ban on
opinion and reputation evidence formerly provided in the rape shield
rule.200 The conclusion that Rule 412 now admits proof of welcomeness by opinion, reputation, or specific instances of conduct is misplaced, however, for the language in subdivision (b)(2) of the rule
(excepting certain proof from the civil evidence shield) provides for the
admission of specific acts only.
The civil exception to the sexual harassment evidence shield
contains two coordinate provisions. Evidence offered to prove welcomeness may be admissible according the the (b)(2) exception if it is
admissible under the rules of evidence and its probative value
"substantially outweighs" its prejudicial effect.20, The civil exception
196. Berger Report at 27-28 (cited in note 78).
197. Notes of Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 412.
198. F.R.C.P. 26(b)(1).
199. Rule 26(c) was enacted to "prevent the unjust effects" that abuse of the discovery
process might precipitate. Priest, 98 F.R.D. at 761. In conjunction with the Amended Rule,
then, evidence of the plaintiffs past sexual history, as a general matter, is neither discoverable
nor admissible.
200. See notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
201. F.R.E. 412 (b)(2).
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to Amended Rule 412 therefore requires that proof of welcomeness
must be admissible under the extant evidence rules before the (b)(2)
balancing test is applied. The existing rules of evidence that govern
proof of welcomeness prescribe that only specific conduct may be
offered in evidence. Reference to evidence "otherwise admissible"
under the federal rules thus ensures that only specific acts may be
considered for admisssion under the Amended Rule.
The welcomeness standard enunciated in Meritor calls for the
use of character evidence. Character evidence is proof that reflects
upon a person's disposition or upon the person's disposition in respect
of a general trait, such as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness.202
The welcomeness standard of sexual harassment law invites the
introduction of character evidence that is reflective of the plaintiffs
disposition with regard to sex and expressions of sexuality as well as
her capacity for offense.
The law of evidence carefully constrains the use of character
evidence in varying contexts based upon considerations of probativeness and prejudice. 20 3 Character questions arise in two ways in litigation.204 First, a person's character may be a material element of a
crime, claim or defense. 20 5 That is, the question of character may be a
20 6
material fact in determining the rights and liabilities of the parties.
In this context, character is said to be "in controversy" or "in issue."
Cases in which character is in controversy fall under Federal Rule of

Evidence 405(b).201

Rule 405(b) places no restrictions upon whether

character may be proved by opinion, reputation, or specific acts evidence because, if character is an essential element, parties should be
2
free to utilize evidence that is most probative. 08

Litigants may also seek to introduce character evidence when
character itself is not an essential element of a claim or defense. In
this instance, character evidence is used "circumstantially" to establish that an individual acted in conformity with his character on the
202. Cleary, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 195 at 574-75 (cited in note 78). See also Notes
of Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 406.
203. Cleary, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 186 at 549.
204. Stephen A. Saltzburg and Michael M. Martin, FederalRules of Evidence Manual 213
(Michie, 5th ed. 1990).
205. Id.
206. Cleary, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 187 at 551 (cited in note 78) (providing as
examples a negligence action for entrusting an automobile to an incompetent driver and an
action for defamation).
207. F.R.E. 405(b) applies to cases "in which character or a trait of character of a person is
an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense .... "
208. Saltzburg and Martin, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual at 302 (cited in note 204);
Cleary, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 188 at 552 (cited in note 78).
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occasion in question.29 The circumstantial use of character evidence
is strictly regulated by the federal evidence rules due to its highly
prejudicial impact. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) prohibits the
introduction of circumstantial character evidence to establish action
in conformity with the actor's propensity.21 The "propensity rule" of
Rule 404(a) bars the conclusion that past acts prove the commission of
the act that is the subject of litigation.211
Evidence that is probative of character may be relevant as
circumstantial proof of a material fact that is distinct from whether
an individual acted in conformity with his character. 212 Character
evidence offered for such a "non-propensity" purpose is allowed by
Rule 404(b).213 If character evidence is offered for a purpose other
than to establish action in conformity with character, it must be
evidence of specific acts only. The text of Rule 404(b) provides that
non-propensity character evidence must be offered in the form of
"crimes, wrongs or acts."214 Proof of a material element of a claim or
defense which implicates character, by the terms of Rule 404(b), may
not be offered in the form of opinion or reputation evidence. 215 Rule
404(b), therefore, effectively designates the mode of character
evidence admissible for non-propensity purposes.
The question, then, is whether sexual harassment is a claim in
which character is an essential element or merely of circumstantial
relevance. Cases in which character is an essential element are ex-

209. Saltzburg and Martin, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual at 214; Christopher B.
Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, FederalEvidence § 99 at 536 (Lawyers Cooperative, 2d ed.
1994).
210. F.R.E. 404(a) reads in pertinent part: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion...."
211. F.R.E. 404(a) provides exceptions to the propensity rule, yet these exceptions apply
only in criminal cases. Saltzburg and Martin, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual at 214-15
(cited in note 204); Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 99 at 537 (cited in note 209).
Propensity evidence excepted from Rule 404(a) may only be proved by opinion or reputation
evidence in accordance with Rule 405(a).
212. Cleary, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 188 at 553 (cited in note 78).
213. F.R.E. 404(b) reads: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident...."
214. F.R.E. 404(b) (emphasis added).
215. Because Rule 404(b) demands that non-propensity character evidence be of substantial
probative value, proof of specific conduct is the only satisfactory mode of evidence suitable for
Rule 404(b) purposes. As stated by the drafters of the federal evidence rules, "Of the three
methods of proving character.., evidence of specific instances is the most convincing." Notes of
Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 405(b). See also Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 99 at
537 (cited in note 209) (stating that only "specific instances of conduct" may prove the factual
matters set forth in Rule 404(b)).
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tremely rare.216 For character to be in controversy it must be the
ultimate fact that, under the substantive law, determines the rights
and liabilities of the parties. 217 When character is an inferential,
rather than the ultimate, fact of a claim it cannot be said to be an es8
sential element.21
A plaintiff's character for sexual promiscuity or sexual aggressiveness is not an essential element in a claim of sexual
harassment.219 The ultimate fact of whether the alleged misconduct
occurred depends upon a range of factors that include not only
examination of the plaintiff's character but also considerations of the
alleged harasser's conduct as well as the employer's degree of
culpability. Evidence of the plaintiffs past sexual conduct is used
216. Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 122 at 537; Linda J. Krieger and Cindi
Fox, Evidentiary Issues in Sexual HarassmentLitigation, 1 Berk. Women's L. J. 115, 118 n.12
(1985).
217. Cleary, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 187 at 551 (cited in note 78).
218. J. Weinstein and M. Berger, 1 Weinstein's Evidence 1401 [03] (Times Mirror, 1994).
219. Prospective plaintiffs must be extremely careful in ensuring that character remains a
"nonessential" element in sexual harassment litigation or they risk losing the benefits of the
new evidence shield. The 1991 Act permits sexual harassment plaintiffs to seek compensatory
and punitive damates, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (Supp. 1993), "provided that the complaining party
cannot recover under section 1981 of this title." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (Supp. 1993) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1981 and Supp. 1993)). Section 1981 does not reach claims of gender
discrimination. See Bobo v. ITT, ContinentialBaking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1981)
(noting that "[allthough § 1981 strikes at many forms of racial discrimination, no court has held
that allegations of gender based discrimination fall within its purview. Courts at every level of
the federal judiciary have considered the question and reached the opposite result"); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) (explaining that "42 U.S.C. § 1981 is in no way addressed
to ... categories of selectivity [based on gender or religion]"). Thus, virtually the only means for
the plaintiff to obtain compensatory and punitive damages for sexual harassment under federal
law are pursuant to the provisions of the 1991 Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (Supp. 1993). See
Franklinv. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1036-37 (1992) (holding that Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972 affords sexual harassment claimants compensatory and
punitive damages). Under the 1991 Act, however, compensatory and punitive damage awards
are capped and indexed according to the size of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) ($300,000
maximum).
Those plaintiffs, or, more accurately, those plaintiffs' lawyers who seek recovery beyond the
statutory limits of the 1991 Act risk coopting the benefits of Amended Rule 412 in the pursuit of
more money. In essence, if a plaintiff adds a pendant state tort claim of emotional distress to
her federal action for sexual harassment, the same jury that is barred by Amended Rule 412
from hearing evidence of the plaintiffs prior sexual conduct as proof of welcomeness must hear
the same evidence for purposes of determining whether she was indeed offended by the
defendant's sexual advances. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (Supp. 1993) (allowing the plaintiff to
request ajury trial if she seeks compensatory and punitive damages). Character is an essential
element in emotional distress claims because the plaintiffs charcter for offense is the
supervening issue that determines the validity of her claim. Cleary, ed., McCormick on
Evidence § 187 at 551 (cited in note 78).
While the plaintiff may seek a limiting instruction from the court to the jury confining
sexual history evidence to the determination of emotional distress, there is no way to be certain
that the jury will not consider the plaintiffs past sexual conduct in assessing welcomeness.
Potential plaintiffs must therefore carefully consider whether the costs of impleading emotional
distress ouweight the benefits of enhanced recovery.
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circumstantially to establish her invitation to or provocation of the
alleged harassment on the occasion charged. Proof of welcomeness
may not be used to demonstrate that the plaintiff acted in conformity
with her promiscuous or aggresssive character, for this would violate
Rule 404(a)'s propensity rule. Rather, proof of welcomeness is used
circumstantially to prove one element or component of the alleged
transaction. Evidence of welcomeness is thus governed by the "other
purposes" provision of Rule 404(b).
The defendant's capacity to show that his advances were welcomed by the plaintiff is a material fact in sexual harassment litigation that may be proved circumstantially only by offering evidence of
the plaintiffs sexually explicit conduct. The defendant's proof of
welcomeness, in accordance with Rule 404(b), is thus limited to specific instances of conduct.

The requirement of Rule 412(b)(2) that excepted evidence must
be "otherwise admissible" ensures that, notwithstanding the disposal
of the explicit ban on opinion and reputation evidence, only specific
instances of the plaintiffs conduct may be introduced by defendants.
Proof of welcomeness, then, even prior to the application of the balancing test for civil cases, is limited by the terms of Amended Rule
412.
C. The Calculationof ProbativeQuality and PrejudicialImpact
Pursuantto the Rule 412(b)(2) Balancing Test
The second provision of the (b)(2) exception to Amended Rule
412 admits evidence of sexual behavior or predisposition if "its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim
and of unfair prejudice to any party. '220

The language of the (b)(2)

balancing test tracks that of the original rape shield rule.221 Yet,
while the rape shield rule reversed the standard of admissible evidence pursuant to Rule 403, the balancing test of the civil evidence
shield is an even more stringent constraint upon the admissibility of
sexual history evidence.
Rule 403 delimits the range of otherwise admissible evidence if
the prejudicial impact of such evidence substantially outweighs its
probative value.22

Rule 403 applies a cost-benefit analysis to prof-

220. F.R.E. 412(b)(2).
221. Subdivision (c)(3) of former F.R.E. 412 read in pertinent part: "If the court determines
...that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant and that the probative value of
such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible .... "
222. F.R.E. 403.
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fered evidence.2 23 The costs of an item of proof are not compared
directly to its benefits, however, for the Rule 403 balancing test is
weighted in favor of the admission of probative evidence. Even if the
probative quality of proffered evidence is subordinate to its prejudicial
effect, it may remain admissible.
The language of Rule
403-requiring that the danger of unfair prejudice must
"substantially" outweigh probative value-contemplates that a lesser
quantum of probative worth counterbalances a comparatively greater
potential for prejudice.

24

The balancing test of the sexual harassment evidence shield
reverses the standard set forth in Rule 403. Under the new rule, the
presumption is that proof of sexual behavior or predisposition, although relevant, should remain inadmissible unless the defendant
demonstrates a particular need for the evidence. Moreover, the costbenefit analysis envisioned by the Rule 412(b)(2) exception
significantly weights the scales against the probative value of sexual
history evidence. The balancing test acknowledges the devastating
prejudicial effect of sexual history evidence and, accordingly,
mandates that the probative value of proffered evidence must
substantially outweigh its potential to prejudice the plaintiff in the
eyes of the factfinder. Thus, under the Amended Rule 412(b)(2)
balancing test, the proponent has access to only narrowly tailored,
exceptionally probative, proof of welcomeness.
This admissibility standard restores the higher threshold of
probative value that Congress removed from the original rape shield
rule. It was noted during hearings on the rape shield rule that the
need to demonstrate "substantial" probative worth could run afoul of
a defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause protections. 225
The final version of the rule, therefore, omitted the word
"substantially" from its balancing test for excepted evidence. 226

223. See, Cleary, ed., McCormick on Evidence §185 at 544 (cited in note 78) (stating that
Rule 403 is the mechanism by which courts determine whether the "value [of evidence] is worth
what it costs").
224. See Mueller and Kirkpatrick, 1 Federal Evidence § 93 at 479 (cited in note 209)
(explaining that "the power to exclude evidence under FRE 403 should be sparingly exercised.
The tenor of the language supports this conclusion, since it contemplates admitting rather than
excluding evidence when probative worth seems equally balanced against dangers like prejudice
and confusion of issues").
225. See Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976) (statement of Roger A.
Pauley, Deputy Chief, Legislation and Special Projects Section, Criminal Division, Department
of Justice).
226. See subdivision (c)(3) of Former F.R.E. 412 (articulating balancing test without use of
the word "substantially").
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The new evidence shield, however, restores the proponent's
burden of establishing substantial probative value.227 Civil defendants must not only demonstrate the probative worth of their evidence, but also its capacity to overcome a more stringent admissibility
standard than that imposed under the old rule. The Rule 403 balancing test has thus been effectively reversed, both in terms of emphasis
and magnitude, by the civil amendments to Rule 412. The focus under the (b)(2) balancing test is upon prejudicial impact, and a greater
quantum of probative value must be shown to overcome the presumption against admissibility.
This type of reverse Rule 403 balancing test appears only one
other time in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 609(b) allows past
convictions more than ten years old to be used for impeachment purposes only if "the probative value of the conviction ... substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect.228 Rule 609(b), after promulgation by

the Supreme Court, was revised by Congress to admit evidence of
2
stale convictions, yet only in rare and exceptional circumstances. 29
The stringency of the admissibility standard for stale convictions
reflects a basic distrust of the probative value of such evidence concerning the present tendency of a witness for truthfulness and veracity.23 0 The drafters of the rule also recognized the exceptional poten-

tial for prejudice resulting from the presentation of prior criminal

227. It is crucial to note that Rule 412 reverses the burden of demonstrating admissibility
established by Rule 403. The usual procedure under Rule 403 is for the opponent to justify the
exclusion of evidence. See Saltzburg and Martin, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual at 164
(cited in note 204) (suggesting that a motion in limine might best serve the interests of
opponents). Conversely, the (b)(2) exception to Amended Rule 412 requires the proponent to
justify admissibility. Notes of Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 412. With respect to evidence of
welcomeness, this burden shifting lightens the plaintiff's load. "If the evidence is... offered
pursuant to... subdivision [(b)(2)], the burden of demonstrating admissibility is shifted to the
proponent of the evidence. Meritor, however, assumes that the opponent has the Rule 403
burden of persuading the court to exclude." Berger Report at 11 (cited in note 78).
228. F.R.E. 609(b).
229. Both the Supreme Court and House Judiciary Committee versions of the rule
contained an absolute ban on evidence of convictions older than ten years. Rules of Evidence,
H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., in U.S.C.CAN. 7051, 7085 (1974). The Senate
adopted a modified version of the rule, admitting evidence of stale convictions, but only if
supported by specific facts and circumstances. Rules of Evidence, S. Rep. No. 93-1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., in U.S.C.CA.N. 7051, 7061-62 (1974). While permitting the use of prior
convictions, the Senate Judiciary Committee asserted that "[ilt is intended that convictions over
10 years old will be admitted very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances." Id. at 7062.
The Senate version of the rule was ultimately adopted with the added requirement of advance
notice of intent to use evidence of past convictions. Rules of Evidence, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 931597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., in U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7103 (1974).
230. See United States v. Sims, 588 F.2d 1145, 1147-48 (6th Cir. 1978) (noting that "stale
convictions have little, if any, probative value for determining the credibility of a witness, and
their admission into evidence should be allowed only in exceptional circumstances").
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acts.2 1 Accordingly, this provision has been read narrowly by the
232
courts.

While the admissibility of past convictions and prior sexual
history gives rise to qualitatively different considerations of probativeness and prejudice, the magnitude of these considerations is
largely the same. The offer of prior convictions to impeach a witness
and sexual history to establish welcomeness both involve the use of
prior "bad acts" as substantive proof. Neither form of evidence is
233
generally probative of the matters that they are intended to prove,
and their potential for prejudice led the drafters of the federal
evidence rules to enact uniquely stringent standards of admissibility.
Given the singularity of evidentiary concerns underlying the use of
stale convictions and past sexual history, the narrow construction of
the balancing test of Rule 609(b) should translate into a similarly
stringent application of Amended Rule 412(b)(2). The interpretation
of Rule 609(b), admitting proof of prior convictions only in rare and
exceptional circumstances,2 should guide the interpretation of the
balancing test for proof of sexual history.
A stringent standard of admissibility fails to define, however,
what types of evidence remain "substantially" probative. While the
(b)(2) balancing test has been drafted to foreclose most forms of proof
of welcomeness, certain evidence nonetheless survives the presumption against admissibility.
Unfortunately, the rule's text and
Advisory Committee commentary provide very little guidance regarding the continued validity of otherwise proscribed evidence.2 5 While
the criminal provisions of Amended Rule 412 contain specific exceptions for certain types of proof,23 the Advisory Committee opted for
the balancing test in subdivision (b)(2) in recognition of the scope and

231. Id. at 1148.
232. See, for example, United States v. Solomon, 686 F.2d 863, 872-73 (11th Cir. 1982)
(holding that "evidence of convictions more than ten years old may be admitted only in
'exceptional circumstances'" (quoting United States v. Cathey, 591 F.2d 268, 276 (5th Cir.
1979))); United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528, 531 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that "since the
power is to be exercised only in the 'rare' and 'exceptional' case, the District Court is required
under the Rule to support its finding with 'specific facts and circumstances' ").
233. See Part III.B.3 of this Note regarding the lack of probative value of past sexual
history as proof of welcomeness.
234. Solomon, 686 F.2d at 872-73.
235. Judge Ralph Winter, chair of the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, stated that
the lack of affirmative guidance on the (b)(2) balancing test enhances the discretion of the courts
in applying the rule. "There will be a lot of intermediate cases .... And the courts will just
have to work it out case by case." Schultz and Woo, Wall St. J. at Al (cited in note 1).
236. See F.R.E. 412(b)(1)(A)-(C) and accompanying Advisory Committee Commentary. The
Advisory Committee Note provides case cites to guide interpretation of the criminal exceptions
to the rule.
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variety of evidence offerable under a theory of welcomeness.37 Thus,
courts are left with little guidance as to what constitutes substantially
probative evidence under the new regime of Amended Rule 412.
Some courts, however, have already engaged in the type of
balancing that is envisioned by the new civil evidence shield. These
courts have recognized that evidence of sexual behavior or predisposition is particularly damaging to sexual harassment plaintiffs, and,
perhaps more importantly, that its probative value is exceedingly low.
Reference to the analysis of these cases, coupled with the above arguments for narrow application of the (b)(2) balancing test, should
enable courts to administer the new evidence shield in accordance
with its objectives.
First, the complainant's sexual behavior with third parties
outside the workplace is well beyond the scope of evidence capable of
surviving the sexual harassment evidence shield. In Priest v.
Rotary,23 the district court issued a protective order under F.R.C.P.
26(c)239 to block the employer's attempt to discover information re-

garding the plaintiffs prior sexual relationships. 24O In addition to
noting the chilling effect upon the institution of sexual harassment
claims were such discovery to proceed, 241 the court disposed of the
defendant's discovery efforts by asserting that the inferences raised
by introduction of the plaintiffs sexual history were so weak that they
242
could not outweigh the obvious risk of prejudice.
The district court in Cronin v. United Service Stations, Inc.243

reached a similar conclusion with respect to the probative value of the
plaintiffs sexual history with third parties outside the workplace.
The defendants in Cronin sought to show that because the complainant was abused by her boyfriend at home, she was incapable of being
offended by workplace harassment.244 The court dismissed the defen237. The Notes of the Advisory Committee, F.R.E. 412, provide that, "[slubdivision
(b)(2)... employs a balancing test rather than the specific exceptions stated in subdivision (b)(1)
in recognition of the difficulty of foreseeing future developments in the law. Greater flexibility
is needed to accommodate evolving causes of action such as claims for sexual harassment."
238. 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
239. F.R.C.P. 26(c) provides that, upon motion by a party or a person from whom discovery
is a right, a court may issue an order "to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense .... "
240. Priest,98 F.R.D. at 756-57 n.1.
241. Id. at 761.
242. Id. at 760. While the defendant was seeking to use the plaintiffs sexual history to
establish her practice of pursuing sexual relationships for economic gain, the court's analysis of

the probative value of past sexual history with third parties applies equally well to the use of
past intimate relationships as proof of welcomeness.
243. 809 F. Supp. 922 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
244. Id. at 932.
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dants' offer of abuse as irrelevant to the demonstration of welcomeness.245 Noting that Title VII litigation should not become a tool for
further harassment of the victim, the court concluded that "absent a
showing of a particularized relevance and need to delve into the
deeply private sexual life of a party," a court should not allow the offer
of such irrelevant evidence. 5
Cases like Cronin and Priest reflect the conception that the
plaintiff's sexual behavior with third parties outside the workplace is
illegitimate proof of welcomeness. For purposes of Amended Rule
412, this evidence does not rise to the level of materiality demanded
by the civil evidence shield.
Second, the plaintiffs sexually explicit conduct outside the
workplace, even if known to her harasser, also does not meet the
substantially probative test set forth in Amended Rule 412(b)(2). The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Burns v. McGregor Electronic
Industries, Inc.,247 reversed the lower court's finding of welcomeness
based upon nude pictures of the plaintiff having appeared in a national magazine.248 The court found that the plaintiff, by posing nude
in a magazine replete with lewd and sexually explicit material, did
not waive the right to claim offense at her employer's advances.24 9 If
appearing nude in a magazine distributed throughout the workplace25 0
is insufficient evidence of welcomeness, similarly suggestive conduct
245. Id. The court went on to recognize "[that [the plaintiff] may have been abused at
home in no way means that [the plaintiff] deserved abuse at work, that she 'welcomed' [the
defendant's] abuse, or that she could not possibly be affected by [the defendant's] actions
because she was used to such abuse." Id.
246. Id.
247. 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993).
248. The procedural history of Burns is fairly convoluted, yet fully described in Laddy, 78
Iowa L. Rev. at 948-951 (cited in note 163). In essence, a panel of the Eighth Circuit had
reversed as internally inconsistent the district court's factual finding that, although the
workplace advances were unwelcome, plaintiff lacked the capacity for offense. Burns, 989 F.2d
at 961 (citing Burns ElectronicIndustries,Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 565 (8th Cir. 1992)). The court of
appeals remanded the case with instructions for the district court to consider the totality of the
circumstances in evaluating the plaintiffs hostile work environment claim. Id. The district
court, on remand, found that the workplace advances created an abusive working environment,
but that, again, "the employer's behavior did not offend the plaintiff because she had earlier
posed nude for Easyriders." Id. at 961-62.
249. Burns, 989 F.2d at 963. The court stated that "[t]he plaintiffs choice to pose for a
nude magazine outside work hours is not material to the issue of whether plaintiff found her
employer's work-related conduct offensive." Id. The court went on to state: "[The plaintiffs]
private life, regardless how reprehensible the trier of fact might find it to be, did not provide
lawful acquiescence to unwanted sexual advances at her work place by her employer. To hold
otherwise would be contrary to Title VI's goal of ridding the work place of any kind of
unwelcome sexual harassment." Id.
250. The magazine photos of the plaintiff, showing her pelvic tattoo and pierced nipples,
were circulated through the workplace in support of a petition drafted by her fellow employees
for her termination. Burns, 955 F.2d at 561.
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outside the workplace should also fail the Rule 412(b)(2) balancing
test.2 51
Third, the ban on proof of welcomeness should not end at the
employer's door, for sexually explicit behavior within the workplace is
equally infirm as evidence of accession to sexual advances on the
occasion charged. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged
in Swentek v.USAir, Inc.252 that the plaintiff's participation in workplace sexual pranks and innuendo was insufficient to block her claim
of sexual harassment.253

In assessing welcomeness, then, the plain-

tiffs election to "fit in" by behaving like her coworkers should not be
misinterpreted as an invitation to harassment.254

In addition, the

plaintiffs choice of apparel should not be similarly misconstrued.255
Fourth, the fact that participation in workplace sexual banter
does not waive claims of offense means that the plaintiffs duty to
warn of unwelcomeness should also be dispatched. If the plaintiffs
involvement in workplace sexual innuendo does not entitle the defendant to presume welcomeness, then nothing is needed to dispel an
already illegitimate assumption. 2 56 In short, if the plaintiffs underly-

251. Women often engage in sexually explicit conduct for reasons entirely unrelated to
sexual expression. Many need the money earned for appearing nude in a magazine or topless in
a bar. See Laddy, 78 Iowa L. Rev,. at 956 n.123 (cited in note 163) (citing Pamela Mendels, At
the Top of the Topless Heap; Even FantasylandExacts a High Toll; Money Is Good, But Burnout
Is High, Newsday 50 (Dec. 20, 1992)). Mendels writes that "[flor dancers with little education
and few other prospects, the money represents a fortune, honestly made. 'I'm not on welfare.
I'm not laying on my back. I don't have sugar daddies.. .,' says Dakota, 29, a mother of three."
Id.
252. 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987).
253. "Plaintiffs use of foul language or sexual innuendo in a consensual setting does not
waive 'her legal protections against unwelcome harassment.'... The trial judge must determine
whether plaintiff welcomed the particular conduct in question from the alleged harasser." Id. at
557 (citingKatzv. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983)).
254. See, for example, Cardin v. Via Tropical Fruits,Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16302 *49
(July 9, 1993). In finding sexual harassment unwelcome, the court stated that, "[tihe necessary
efforts of a victim to cope with a difficult and oppressive work environment in order to retain a
much-needed job can be mistaken for welcomeness. A victim of pervasive sexual innuendo and
vulgar joking may participate in order to 'fit in' and defuse the offensive milieu despite the fact
that the harassment exacts a substantial psychological toll." Id.
255. See Honea v. SGS Control Services, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (E.D. Tex. 1994)
(stating that "the text of Title VII does not require a woman to wear a bra in order to pursue a
claim for sexual harassment"); Wilson v. Wayne County, 856 F. Supp. 1254, 1260 (M.D. Tenn.
1994) (finding "[t]he fact that an eighteen-year-old girl wore shorts during the summer months
in Tennessee, wore a bathing suit on a canoe trip, and engaged in non-sexual horseplay with a
co-worker her own age should not be perceived by even the most optimistic fifty-three-year-old
man as a willingness to have sex with him").
256. The EEOC has disposed of the plaintiffs duty to warn of unwelcomeness, yet
maintains the requirement that the complainant's conduct must indicate the advance is
unwelcome. See EEOC Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, No. 915.050
(March 19, 1990) in EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) 3114 at 3267:
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ing conduct is not probative of welcomeness, then no duty to warn
arises.
Fifth, authorities that properly construe sexually explicit
workplace conduct demand affirmative indication by the plaintiff that
her behavior is directed at her harasser.- 7 If the defendant is unaware of the plaintiffs conduct, such conduct cannot form the basis of
a welcomeness defense. 58 Substantially probative proof of welcomeness requires a finding that the plaintiff initiated or reciprocated
specific instances of contact with the defendant that surpass the
threshold of banter, joking, or attempts to establish familiarity.
Even if the plaintiffs conduct does exceed this threshold level,
however, it must still be linked temporally and reciprocally to the
defendant's advances. In Shrout v. Black Clawson Co.,259 for example,
the court concluded that, notwithstanding the existence of a prior
sexual relationship between the parties,2 6 0 the defendant's behavior
created a hostile work environment.21 The offensive conduct occurred
after the termination of the parties' relationship,2 62 and was of such
degree as to vitiate any link between their present and past interac263
tions.
2
Similarly, in Wangler v. Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc., 4
the court refused to grant summary judgment to the defendant despite proof that the plaintiff had baked birthday cakes for him, signed
cards to him "Love, Andrea," and had given him a picture of herself in
a belly dancing costume. 265 The court found this evidence insuffi-

While a complaint or protest is helpful to a charging party's case, it is not a necessary
element of the claim. Indeed, the Commission recognizes that victims may fear
repercussions from complaining about the harassment and that such fear may explain a
delay in opposing the conduct. . . . [Yet,] [w]hen welcomeness is at issue, the
investigation should determine whether the victim's conduct is consistent, or
inconsistent, with her assertion that the sexual conduct is unwelcome.

Id. at 3270-71.
257. See Radford, 72 N.C. L. Rev. at 532 (cited in note 41) (proposing a new definition of
welcomeness that "anything other than 'yes' must be interpreted to mean no'" ... unless the
defendant "can show by objective evidence that the target affirmatively and freely solicited or
consented to his advances").
258. Swentek, 830 F.2d at 557. See also Zowayyed v. Lowen Co., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1497,
1504 (D. Kan. 1990) (refusing to credit defendant's testimony regarding plaintiffs joking and
bragging about sexual advances to a coworker as proof of welcomeness for summary judgement

purposes).
259. 689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ohio 1988).

260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 779.
Id. at 780-81.
Id. at 779.
Id. at 780.

264. 742 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Hawaii 1990).

265. Id. at 1463-64.
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ciently connected to the charged event wherein the defendant had
266
forced himself upon the plaintiff.

The evidentiary standard for proof of welcomeness enacted by
Rule 412 thus narrows the range of evidence available to defendants.
Examination of the case law which properly calibrates the balance
between probative value and prejudicial impact reveals that the reach
of the courts should not extend beyond the workplace. Moreover, even
sexually provocative behavior exhibited in the workplace does not rise
to the level of "substantial" probativeness unless directed at the harasser and related to his advances both reciprocally and temporally.
The plaintiff's election to speak, dress, or act in a certain manner
should not be misconstrued by the courts as evidence of welcomeness.
One who defends against claims of sexual harassment must establish
a specific relationship between himself and the plaintiff supported by
specific facts indicative of welcomeness. The defendant should not be
permitted to appropriate the complainant's behavior with other individuals, nor should he offer proof that has become stale or irrelevant
to the events in question.
V. CONCLUSION

The sexual harassment evidence shield of Amended Rule 412 is
consistent with and in furtherance of the remedial objectives of Title
VII. Proper application of the new rule should serve the dual policy
goals of protecting victims' privacy and encouraging them to bring
claims. In addition, the civil provisions of the Amended Rule cure an
evidentiary abuse that threatens effective enforcement of Title VII.
The sexual harassment evidence shield blocks access to proof of welcomeness that is both highly prejudicial and insufficiently probative
to merit admission. The civil amendments to Rule 412, while narrowing the scope of evidence available to defendants, except proof that
istruly probative of welcomeness. Such evidence distinguishes advances that have been invited by the plaintiff from those that are
unwelcomed and should be sanctioned.
PaulNicholas Monnin*

266. Id. The plaintiff, in support of her claim, introduced a letter from the defendant that
read "our relationship was never mutual. You looked to me for paternal love, whereas I
desperately wanted you for my Lolita." Id. at 1463.
*
The Author would like to thank Professors Robert Belton, Rebecca Brown, Anne
Coughlin, and David Fischer for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Note. The
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APPENDIX I

Text of Amended Rule 412, Federal Rules of Evidence
Rule 412. Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past
Sexual Behavior or Alleged Sexual Predisposition
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is
not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged
sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged
in other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if
otherwise admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused
was the source of semen, injury or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution;
and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant.
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior
or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is
otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair

Author would also like to thank Ken Pollack, Michelle Jerusalem, Melanie Black Dubis, and
Amy Pepke for their patience and extraordinary editorial assistance. This Note is dedicated to
my wife, Alicia, for all her support.
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prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's reputation is
admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.
(c) Procedure to determine admissibility.
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b)
must(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is
offered unless the court, for good cause requires a different time for
filing or permits filing during trial; and
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim
or, when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or representative.
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must
conduct a hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a right
to attend and be heard. The motion, related papers, and the record of
the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless the court
orders otherwise.
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APPENDIX II

Text of Proposed Rule 412, Federal Rules of Evidence
Rule 412. Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of Victim's Past Sexual
Behavior or Predisposition
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. Evidence of past sexual
behavior or predisposition of an alleged victim of sexual misconduct is
not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding except as provided
in subdivisions (b) and (c).
(b) Exceptions. Evidence of the past sexual behavior or predisposition of an alleged victim of sexual misconduct may be admitted
only if it is otherwise admissible under these rules and is(1) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior with someone other than the person accused of the sexual misconduct, when
offered to prove that the other person was the source of semen, other
physical evidence, or injury;
(2) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior with the
person accused of the sexual misconduct, when offered to prove consent by the alleged victim;
(3) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior, when
offered in a criminal case in circumstances where exclusion of the
evidence would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant; or
(4) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior, or other
evidence concerning the sexual behavior or predisposition of the
victim, when either type of evidence is offered in a civil case in circumstances where [the evidence is essential to a fair and accurate
determination of a claim or defense] [its probative value substantlally
outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the parties and harm to
the victim].
(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility. Evidence must not
be offered under this rule unless the proponent obtains leave of court
by a motion fied under seal, specifically describing the evidence and
stating the purposes for which it will be offered. The motion must be
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served on the alleged victim and the parites and must be filed at least
15 days before trial unless the court directs an earlier filing or, for
good cause shown, permits a later filing. After giving the parties and
alleged victim an opportunity to be heard in chambers, the court must
determine whether, under what conditions, and in what manner and
form the evidence may be admitted. The motion and the record of any
hearing in chambers must, unless otherwise ordered, remain under
seal.

